

ROBERT BLACK

LEEDS

## REPUBLICANISM<sup>1</sup>

*To the memory of Nicolai Rubinstein (1911-2002)*

At the end of the Middle Ages, the usual starting point for commenting on various political constitutions was Aristotle's treatment in *The Nicomachean Ethics*:

Politie autem, sunt species tres. Equales autem et transgressiones, puta corruptiones harum. Sunt autem politie quidem regnum, et aristocratia, tertia autem que a precisiis, quam timocraticam dicere conveniens videtur, politiam autem consueverunt ipsam plures vocare. Harum autem optima quidem regnum, pessima autem timocratia. Transgressio autem regni quidem, tyrannis. Ambo enim monarchie. Differunt autem plurimum. Tyrannus quidem enim, sibi ipsi conferens intendit; rex autem, quod subditorum. Non enim est rex qui non per se sufficiens, et omnibus bonis superexcellens. Talis autem, nullo indiget. Utilia igitur sibi ipsi quidem non utique intendet, subditis autem. Qui enim non talis, clerotes utique quidam erit quam rex. Tyrannis autem, ex contrarietate huic. Sibi enim bonum, persequitur; et manifestius in hac quo-

<sup>1</sup> The literature on this theme is vast. I have particularly benefited from the following in preparing this paper: J.M. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages*, Princeton 1992; ID., 'Civic humanism' and medieval political thought, in *Renaissance Civic Humanism. Reappraisals and Reflections*, ed. J. Hankins, Cambridge 2000, pp. 30-74; Q. SKINNER, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Volume One: The Renaissance*, Cambridge 1978; *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, ed. G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli, Cambridge 1990; N. RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius of Padua and Italian political thought of his time*, in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. Hale, J.R.L. Highfield and B. Smalley, London 1965, pp. 44-75; R.G. WITT, *Coluccio Salutati and his Public Letters*, Geneva 1976; C.T. DAVIS, *Dante's Italy and Other Essays*, Philadelphia 1984; M. VIROLI, *From Politics to Reason of State: the acquisition and transformation of the language of politics 1250-1600*, Cambridge 1992; F. GILBERT, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: politics and history in sixteenth-century Florence*, Princeton 1965; J.M. NAJEMY, *Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400*, Chapel Hill N. Carolina 1982; D. DE ROSA, *Coluccio Salutati: il cancelliere e il pensatore politico*, Firenze 1980.

niam pessima. Et pessimum autem, contrarium optimo. Transgreditur autem ex regno in tyrannidem. Pravitas enim est monarchie, tyrannis. Malus autem rex, tyrannus fit. Ex aristocratia autem in oligarchiam, malicia principum qui tribuunt que civitatis, preter dignitatem, et omnia vel plurima bonorum, sibi ipsis, et principatus semper eisdem de plurimo facientes, ditari. Pauci autem principantur et mali pro hiis qui maxime epieikees. Ex timocratia autem utique, in democratiam. Conterminales enim sunt hee. Multitudinis enim vult et timocratia esse, et equales omnes qui in honoracione. Minimum autem malum est democratia. In parvum enim transgreditur politie speciem<sup>2</sup>.

For Aristotle, monarchy was thus the best form of government, but his preference was qualified because of the inherent instability of constitutional forms: monarchy degenerates into tyranny, which is far worse than democracy, the perversion of republicanism.

Aristotle's relativism was even more pronounced in *The Politics*, where he reiterated the view that monarchy was the best form of government, but that its perversion, tyranny, was the worst:

Necesse enim eam quidem quae primae et divinissimae transgressionem, esse pessimam. Regnum autem [...] propter multam excellentiam regis esse; et tyrannidem, pessimam existentem, plurimum distare a politia<sup>3</sup>.

For Aristotle, the best government ('politia') depended on the nature of the people to be governed. If a particular individual or family were more virtuous than the others, then monarchy would be most appropriate. If there were an excellent group capable of political leadership, then aristocracy would be preferable. If there were a people among whom "there naturally exists a warlike multitude able to rule and to obey in turn under a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert", then a republic would be best<sup>4</sup>. Local customs, astrological forces and even climate had to be taken into account: hot climates led to subservience, cold to anarchy and temperate to a republic<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristoteles latinus. Ethica Nicomachea*, tr. R. Grossesteste, ed. R.A. Gauthier, Leiden 1972, pp. 313-14.

<sup>3</sup> ARISTOTLE, *Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Guilelmi de Moerbeke*, ed. F. Susemihl, Leipzig 1872, 4.2.1289a, b.

<sup>4</sup> D. ROSS, *Aristotle*, 5th ed., London 1949, p. 256.

<sup>5</sup> BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*... cit., p. 165; Id., 'Civic humanism'... cit., pp. 66-67; E. LEWIS, *Natural law and expediency in medieval political theory*, "Ethics", 50, 1939-40, pp. 144-63.

In view of Aristotle's penchant for political relativism, it is not surprising to find that most medieval scholastic political theorists expressed no unqualified preference for a particular pure form of government. Thomas Aquinas had been raised in the south of Italy under one of medieval Europe's most centralized governments and, moreover, had spent his maturity in Paris under increasingly authoritarian Capetian rule, and yet not even he was an uncritical absolute monarchist. On the contrary, he favoured a mixed monarchy, in which the authority of the king was tempered by the nobles and the people:

Cuius cum sint diversae species, ut Philosophus tradit in III Politicis, praecipuae tamen sunt regnum, in quo unus principatur secundum virtutem; et aristocratia, idest potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate vel regno, in qua unus praeficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem; et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis enim est optima politia, bene commixta ex regno, in quantum unus praeest; et aristocratia, in quantum multi principantur secundum virtutem; et ex democratia, idest potestate populi, in quantum ex popularibus possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum<sup>6</sup>.

Engelbert of Admont (c. 1250-1331), the son of a noble Austrian family, who studied at Prague and Padua and became a Benedictine abbot in Salzburg and Admont, was even more of a relativist than Aquinas. Repeating Aristotle's views about how climate determines the best form of government<sup>7</sup>, Engelbert declares that there is no one ideal constitution:

[...] non intendimus dicere, quod ista vel illa politia sit optima omnium vel pessima: quia sicut dicit Philosophus Tertio Ethicorum, 'nondum forsitan inventa est optima politia' [...] 'nondum inventa est optima politia,' hoc intelligendum est secundum usum potius quam secundum intellectum: quia invenire talem Regem, qui in nullo faciat aliquid praeter rationem, vel Consulem bonum et virtuosum, qui in nullo excedat medium virtutis, vel talem divitem seu potentem, qui nihil intendit secundum rationem et virtutem, sed omnia secundum suam voluntatem, hoc contingit potius secundum imaginationem

<sup>6</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. R. Busa, vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1980, 1-2.105.1; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 52, n. 38.

<sup>7</sup> BLYTHE, '*Civic humanism*'... cit., p. 67.

et intellectum, quam secundum rem et actum. Tales enim homines plus mentaliter fingere possumus, quam realiter invenire<sup>8</sup>.

John of Paris (c. 1250-1304), a leading Dominican preacher in Paris and famous as a publicist for Philip IV in his conflict with Boniface VIII, tended to favour monarchy over aristocracy or democracy:

Omnis autem multitudo quolibet quaerente quod suum est dissipatur et in diversa dispergitur nisi ad bonum commune ordinetur per aliquem unum cui sit cura de bono communi [...]. Est autem utilius regimen multitudinis per unum qui preest secundum virtutem quam per plures vel paucos virtuosos<sup>9</sup>.

But, in Aristotelian vein, he refused to be categoric:

[...] secularis potestas plus habet diversitatis secundum climatum et complexionum diversitatem [...]. Non sic autem fideles omnes necesse est convenire in aliqua politia communi, sed possunt secundum diversitatem climatum et linguarum et condicionem hominum esse diversi modi vivendi et diverse politiae, et quod virtuosum est in una gente non est virtuosum in alia<sup>10</sup>.

William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347), perhaps the most influential philosopher of the later middle ages, who, after studying at Oxford, was condemned as a heretic by the papacy and spent the end of his life in the service of the anti-papal emperor, Louis of Bavaria, knew that, in the abstract, Aristotle thought that monarchy was the best form of government:

Politia autem optima secularis est regnum, teste Aristotelis.<sup>11</sup>

But he also recognized Aristotle's republican sympathies, inclining him to favour rotating government in order to prevent sedition; in contrast, his own preference, in stable circumstances, was monarchy:

<sup>8</sup> ENGELBERT OF ADMONT, *De regimine principum*, Regensburg 1724, I.17, 38; cfr. BLYTHE, 'Civic humanism'... cit., p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> JOHN OF PARIS, *Tractatus de potestate regia et papali*, in *Johannes Quidort von Paris: Über königliche und päpstliche Gewalt*, ed. F. Beienstein, Stuttgart 1969, chap. 1, p. 76; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*, p. 146.

<sup>10</sup> JOHN OF PARIS, *De potestate regia et papali*... cit., chap. 3, pp. 82-83; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*... cit., p. 145.

<sup>11</sup> WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris*, 3.1.2.1, in *Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperii*, ed. M. Goldast, Frankfurt 1614, p. 790; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*... cit., p. 181, n. 4.

Vult Aristoteles, quod expedit omnes participare principatum [...] quandoque principari, quandoque subiici: quando probabiliter timetur, quod aliter periculosae seditiones orientur, nisi quilibet qui est aeque dignus aliquando principetur. Si autem de huiusmodi seditione minime formidatur, expedit si aliquis invenitur idoneus, ut unus tanquam rex omnibus principetur, etiam secundum totam vitam suam<sup>12</sup>.

Nevertheless, William showed inclinations towards relativism: as far as he was concerned, it was the common good that counted, and otherwise it did not matter how a government arose:

Nam cum talis iurisdictio vel potestas bono communi debeat expedire, non refert a quo instituat<sup>13</sup>.

Another relativist was the French philosopher and scientist, Jean Buridan (ca 1292–after 1358), who observed that God sometimes imposed one-man rule, sometimes a more pluralistic regime:

[...] deus quandoque disponit quod sit unus solus princeps secularium suo populo fideli [...]. Quandoque vere statuit et ordinat quod essent plures [...].<sup>14</sup>

He even went so far as to say that, in the contemporary world, the rule of law without a king was preferable to royal government without law:

Temporibus modernis simpliciter melius est civitatem regi bona lege sine principe quam quocumque principe sine lege<sup>15</sup>.

Relativism too was a key idea in the political thought of Nicole Oresme (c. 1320-1382), one of Buridan's pupils and an important French scientist, theologian and ecclesiastic. Ideally he favoured monarchy:

<sup>12</sup> OCKHAM, *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris...* cit., 3.1.2.17, p. 802; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 169 n. 11. For more examples of Ockham's monarchism, see *ibidem*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>13</sup> WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, *Octo questiones de potestate papae*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham opera politica*, ed. H.S. Offler, vol. 1, Manchester 1974, 3, chap. 9, p. 111; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 170, n. 17.

<sup>14</sup> J. BURIDAN, *Questiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis*, Paris 1513, 8, 1.5, f. 113va; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 178, n. 39.

<sup>15</sup> BURIDAN, *Questiones super libros Politicorum...* cit., 3, 1.4, f.34vb; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 179, n. 40.

Policie royal est la tres melleur [...]. Se tele monarchie estoit juste, ce seroit policie royal laquele est tres bonne et tres divine [...]. Et ce est policie royal tres bonne en excellence [...]. Policie royal [...] est aussi regle et mesure des autres<sup>16</sup>.

But he also recognized the validity of other forms of government:

Naturelement aucune multitude veult estre gouvernée par roy et aucune par un petit nombre de gens vertueus et aucune par tous les citoiens ou par soy meismes. Et le gouvernement qui est convenable par nature et expedient a une multitude ne est pas convenable a l'autre selon la varieté des meurs et de la quantité de la region et du temps et des autres circonstances<sup>17</sup>.

Ideally, Oresme preferred a mixed monarchy, but that might not suit all situations:

Ce est assavoir supposé que ceste multitude soit tele qu'elle ne pourroit actaindre a policie tres bonne simplement, le legislateur doit savoir quele policie est la melleur ou la tres bonne a quoy ceste multitude pourroit actaindre<sup>18</sup>.

Most North European political thinkers in the later Middle Ages were guided by their immediate experiences and so wrote in terms of monarchies, but sometimes they had positive comments to make about republics too. All things being equal, Aquinas was a monarchist, but, in a frequently cited passage, he argued eloquently for the advantages of republicanism over monarchy:

sicut refert Salustius, incredibile est memoratu, quantum adepta libertate in brevi Romana civitas creverit. Plerumque namque contigit ut homines sub rege viventes, segnius ad bonum commune nitantur, utpote aestimantes id quod ad commune bonum impendunt, non sibi ipsis convenire, sed alteri, sub cuius potestate vident esse bona communia. Cum vero bonum commune non vident esse in potestate unius, non attendunt ad bonum commune quasi ad id quod est alterius, sed quilibet attendit ad illud quasi suum: unde experimento videtur quod una civitas per annuos rectores administrata, plus potest interdum quam rex

<sup>16</sup> NICOLE D'ORESME, *Le livre de Politiques d'Aristotel*, ed. A.D. Menut, in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s., 60, part 6 (1970), 3, chap. 20, p. 145; 7, chap. 10, p. 291; 7, chap. 29, p. 324; 3, chap. 20, p. 145: cited by BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., pp. 217-8 n. 48.

<sup>17</sup> ORESME, *Le livre de Politiques...* cit., 3, chap. 26, p. 163; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 237.

<sup>18</sup> ORESME, *Le livre de Politiques...* cit., 4, chap. 1, p. 165; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 237, n. 92.

aliquis, si haberet tres vel quattuor civitates: parvaque servitia exacta a regibus gravius ferunt quam magna onera, si a communitate civium imponantur; quod in promotione Romanae reipublicae servatum fuit. Nam plebs ad militiam scribebatur; et pro militantibus stipendia exsolvebant, et cum stipendiis exsolvendis non sufficeret commune aerarium in usus publicos opes venere privatae [...] <sup>19</sup>.

Engelbert of Admont saw much to praise in the republican government current in Italy at the turn of the fourteenth century, particularly the more popular type of regime in which the power of the nobility was limited:

Et in electione Potestatum et Consulium, et conditione statutorum et faciendorum vel non faciendorum sine timore et periculo procedat secundum virtutem et veritatem, consensum expriment singuli pro hac parte vel illa, non per verba sed per sortes quasdam, quas ballotas vocant. Quod valde videtur rationabile et consultum: quia secundum Philosophum in Primo Rhetoricae, 'duo sunt, quae praecipue impediunt rectum consilium, scilicet timor et error.' In ballotis igitur timori praecavetur per sortem: quia nescitur, quis consenserit in propositum vel in oppositum. Errori vero praecavetur per artem: quia nihilominus liberum est unicuique consulere, quod utilius videatur. Sed quia nobiles pro majori parte aspirant magis ad potentiam et excellentiam suam et suorum, quam ad bonum commune, propter hoc civitates, meliori regimine utentes, raro consueverunt nobiles eligere vel admittere ad consulatus et regimina: sed de popularibus eligunt bonos viros secundum virtutem et amorem, quo se habent multi de talibus ad bonum commune <sup>20</sup>.

Peter of Auvergne (1240s-1304), a pupil of Aquinas's and bishop of Clermont, was a monarchist, like Aquinas and Engelbert of Admont, declaring, for example, that

Item nec pauci possunt principari nisi in quantum consenciant in unum. Ergo magis expedit principari unum principatu maximo et non multitudinem <sup>21</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> THOMAS AQUINAS, *De regimine principum*, in *De regimine principum ad regem Cypri*, in ID., *Opera omnia*, ed. R. Busa, vol. 3, I.4; cfr. R. WITT, *The De tyranno and Coluccio Salutati's view of politics and Roman history*, "Nuova rivista storica", 53, 1969, p. 449. Although he was born in Italy, Aquinas spent most of his maturity in Northern Europe.

<sup>20</sup> ENGELBERT OF ADMONT, *De regimine principum*... cit., 1.7.22; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*... cit., pp. 127-28.

<sup>21</sup> PETER OF AUVERGNE, *Questiones super Politicum*, 3.q.16295vb, cited from Paris Bibliothèque Nationale ms. latin 16089, by BLYTHE, *Ideal Government*... cit., p. 83.

Nevertheless, he also showed sympathy for popular republican government, distinguishing between populaces which are and are not vile or bestial. In the former case, they are more fit to rule than an oligarchy:

[...] est multitudo bestialis et nata subesse principatu dispotico. Altera autem multitudo bene persuasibilis mixta ex sapientibus et ex vulgatis bene persuasibilis [...]. Si autem intelligatur questio de secunda multitudine, dicendum quod expedit illam magis principari quam paucos virtuosos. Cuius ratio est quia [...] illud magis expedit principari quod attingit simul ad illa talia [sc. tria] que exiguntur ad principatum quam illud quod solum attingit ad duo. Sed hoc est ista multitudo in quantum enim in ea sunt prudentes, habet prudentiam et virtutem. In quantum autem multi, habet potentiam. Pauci autem ad prima duo tamen attingunt et ideo magis expedit multitudinem talem dominari quam paucos etiam virtuosos<sup>22</sup>.

If there is a city with notable equality and liberty, then it is better for it to enjoy rule by the populace rather than by middling elements:

[...] si in civitate aliqua cives sint aequales in libertate, melius est eis regi populari, quam republica media<sup>23</sup>.

Despite his theoretical preference for monarchy, Nicole Oresme favoured the Roman Republic and condemned the Empire. The Republic had thrived while the people behaved sensibly and operated a constitution with power shared by monarchical consuls, aristocratic senators and democratic tribunes. But when the Romans relinquished all power to an absolute emperor, their polity deteriorated, their prosperity ended and their power declined:

Mes depuis que le peuple transporta ou bailla toute posté au prince et que il mist le prince sus la lay, assés tost apparut que leur policie ala en empirance et leur prosperité en deffaillant et leur domination en declinant<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> PETER OF AUVERGNE, *Questiones...* cit., 3.q.15.295rb-295va, cited by BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 80.

<sup>23</sup> PETER OF AUVERGNE, *In libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio*, in *The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne. The inedited part*, ed. G. GRECH, Rome 1967, 4.10.643; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 90, n. 34.

<sup>24</sup> ORESME, *Le livre de Politiques...* cit., 5.25, pp. 242-43; cfr. BLYTHE, 'Civic humanism'... cit., p. 43, n. 37.



In the fifteenth century too, there were Northern opponents of kingship and champions of popular sovereignty. For example, Nicolas of Cusa wrote:

Legis autem latio per eos omnes, qui per eam stringi debent, aut maiorem partem aliorum electione fieri debet, quoniam ad commune conferre debet, et quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbari debet, et communis diffinitio ex omnium consensu aut maioris partis solum elicitur. Quare etiam melius pro re publica existit legibus quam optimo viro regi [...]. Ubi enim non principantur leges, ibi non est politia<sup>25</sup>.

By the later middle ages, the great age of the Italian communes may have passed and, with the rise of despotism and oligarchy, republican institutions in Italy may have been in decline; in this kind of political climate, it is not surprising to find a number of Italian voices sympathetic to monarchical government. Dante's advocacy of universal monarchy is too well known to be repeated here, but his contemporary, Giles of Rome (Egidio Colonna / Aegidius Romanus: ca 1243-1316), also argued in favour of monarchy:

Nam sicut universum dirigitur uno principe, ut uno deo, qui est intellectus separatus et purus: sic omnia, quae sunt in homine, si debite regi debent, regenda sunt intellectu et ratione [...]. Si ergo regimen totius universi assimilatur regimini quod debet esse in uno homine: cum civitas sit pars universi, regimen totius civitatis multo magis reservabitur in una domo<sup>26</sup>.

The residual power of the great aristocracy had often overwhelmed the Italian city republics, and it is not hard to recognize in Giles (a member of one of the most illustrious Italian noble families) an opponent of popular republicanism based on social equality:

Sic etiam si plura elementa concurrunt ad constitutionem eiusdem corporis mixti, oportet aliquod elementum praedominans, secundum quod illi mixto competat debitus motus aut debitus situs. Inde est ergo quod in omnibus mixtis dominatur terra: quia omnia talia sunt gravia et naturaliter deorsum

<sup>25</sup> NICOLAS OF CUSA, *De concordantia catholica libri tres*, ed. G. Kallen, Hamburg 1963, 3, proemium, 276-77, p. 318; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 255, n. 24.

<sup>26</sup> AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De regimine principum libri III*, Rome 1556, 2.1.14.154v; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 69.

tendunt [...] cum societas hominum sit naturalis [...] nunquam ex pluribus hominibus fieret naturaliter una societas vel una politia, nisi naturale esset aliquos principari et aliquos servire. Sunt ergo aliqui naturaliter domini, et aliqui naturaliter servi<sup>27</sup>.

Pro-monarchical statements also came from unexpected sources in Italy. One was Coluccio Salutati, who, although chancellor of the Florentine republic, still advocated monarchy in his treatise, *De tyranno*, published in 1400:

Nonne politicum est, et omnium sapientum sententiis difinitum, monarchiam omnibus rerum publicarum conditionibus preferendam, si tamen contingat virum bonum et studiosum sapientie presidere? Nulla libertas maior quam optimo principi cum iusta precipiat obedire. Quod si nichil divinius et melius quam mundus regitur uno solo presidente deo, tanto melius est humanum regimen, quanto propinquius ad illud accedit. Illi vero similis esse non potest, quam unico principiante. Nam et multorum regimen nichil est, nisi in unam sententiam conveniat multitudo; si quidem nisi precipiat unus et ceteri pareant, non unum erit, sed plura regimina [...] Scis inter species principandi tam natura quam ordine, subditorum utilitate necessitateque rerum, omnibus antecedere monarchiam<sup>28</sup>.

*De tyranno* was written in the summer of 1400, when, in the midst of their war against Milan, the Florentines had their hopes pinned on a new emperor who would revoke the ducal title accorded to Gian Galeazzo Visconti by Wenceslas. Since 1397 Florence had been the moving force behind the effort, in alliance with the Imperial Electors, to depose Wenceslas on the grounds that he had debased the dignity of the empire by alienating imperial prerogatives when he created Giangaleazzo duke of Milan. In this period Florence may have been hostile to Wenceslas but was anything but anti-imperial, and Salutati's political thought ran in tandem with Florentine diplomacy; at time when Florence's efforts on behalf of a *renovatio imperii* culminated the deposition of the discredited Wenceslas and the election of Rupert of Bavaria, Salutati published his strongly pro-monarchical and pro-imperial *De tyranno*<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> EGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De regimine principum*, 2.2.13.225v; cfr. BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., p. 76.

<sup>28</sup>C. SALUTATI, *Il trattato "De tyranno" e lettere scelte*, ed. F. Ercole, Bologna 1942, p. 32.

<sup>29</sup> R. BLACK, *The political thought of the Florentine chancellors*, "The Historical Journal", 29, 1986, p. 993; T. LINDNER, *Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter*

Another pro-monarchical chancellor of the Florentine republic was Bartolomeo Scala. In his *Apologues* of 1481 Scala rejects absolute democracy and criticizes republics for lacking constancy and stability; not the people but only leaders of states can command virtue, which is the prerequisite of sovereignty. All this has obvious Medicean overtones, and Scala goes on to argue that among leaders of states exercising sovereignty Cosimo de' Medici was foremost as a result of his special virtue and wisdom. The Medici may not have portrayed or presented themselves as princes of Florence, but they do not seem to have been averse to arguments in favour of monarchy mounted by their close associates, as for example in Scala's *On Laws and Legal Judgements* of 1483:

Quanto igitur [...] vivi potuit melius ad boni viri, bonique iudicis arbitrium duce natura (que libera est semper, nec aliquibus obnoxia extraneis constitutionibus, ipsa sibi pro tempore, pro rebus, pro causis, pro casibus quid decerni oporteat abunde subministrat) quam eam sibi imposuisse homines necessitatem ... Ut enim naute gubernatore amisso huc atque illuc temere circumaguntur, pereuntque sepe illisi scopulis vel absorti fluctibus, aut certe acti ventorum flatibus eo deferuntur, unde postea regredi humana aliqua opera non licet; quemadmodum dispergi consueverunt oves gregis pastorem si percusseris; sicut milites, si quis imperatorem casus subtraxerit, confusione opplentur, variaque in pericula et mortes corruunt; ita si rectorem, si custodem, si ducem rerum omnium actionumque humanarum neglexeris, contempseris, abieceris, nihil est omnino eorum que timere et fugere merito homines consueverunt non formidandum, non expectandum, non ferendum<sup>30</sup>.

Just as some Italians echoed the monarchism typical of Northern political thought, so others too adopted the Aristotelian relativism characteristic of ultramontane scholastic philosophers. One Italian relativist was Bartolus of Sassoferrato. He qualifies constitutions according to size: for the smallest, popular republican government is most suitable, for example in his native city of Perugia; medium-sized towns, are best suited to aristocracy, as in the contemporary cities of Venice and Florence; only the largest states are suited to monarchy, the current example being the Roman Empire<sup>31</sup>.

*König Wenzel*, II, Braunschweig 1880, 504-6; D. DE ROSA, *Coluccio Salutati: il cancelliere e il pensatore politico*, Florence 1980, p. xiii.

<sup>30</sup> BARTOLOMEO SCALA, *De legibus et iudiciis dialogus*, ed. L. Borghi, "La bibliofilia", 42, 1990, 70; cfr. A. BROWN, *Bartolomeo Scala*, Princeton 1979, pp. 287-292.

<sup>31</sup> BLYTHE, *Ideal Government...* cit., pp. 174-75.

Another notable example here was Savonarola. Like Aristotle and his scholastic followers, he declares:

Essendo dunque quel governo buono, che ha cura del ben commune così spirituale come temporale, o sia amministrato per uno solo, o per li principali del popolo, o per tutto el popolo, è da sapere che, parlando assolutamente, el governo civile è buono, e quello degli ottimati è migliore, e quello de' re è ottimo. Perché, essendo la unione e pace del popolo el fine del governo, molto meglio si fa e conserva questa unione e pace per uno che per più, e meglio per pochi che per la moltitudine; perché, quando tutti li uomini di una comunità hanno a risguardare ad uno solo e quello obedire, non si distrangono in parte, ma tutti si constringono nello amore o nel timore di quello. Ma quando sono più, chi risguarda a uno e chi ad un altro, e a chi piace uno e a chi piace o dispiace un altro; e non rimane el popolo così bene unito come quando uno solo regno; e tanto meno rimane unito, quanto sono più quelli che governano. *Item*, la virtù unita è più forte che la dispersa: onde el fuoco ha più forza quando ha unite e constrette insieme le sue parti, che quando le sono sparse e dilatate<sup>32</sup>.

This may be true 'assolutamente parlando', but there are some peoples who cannot abide monarchy because they are required by their nature to be ruled by a 'governo civile', a popular republican government.

[...] se noi esaminiamo bene le sentenzie e ragioni delli sapienti [...] dicono tale governo [sc. monarchia] convenirsi alli popoli che sono di natura servile, come sono quelli che mancano di sangue, o di ingegno [...] ma li popoli che sono ingegnosi ed abbondano di sangue e sono audaci, non si possono facilmente reggere da uno, se lui non li tiranneggia [...] come si è visto sempre nella Italia [...].<sup>33</sup>

Echoing the arguments of Aristotle and the scholastics, Savonarola suggested that climate determined the appropriate form of government:

Nelle parte di questo emisperio calide, gli uomini sono più pusillanimi [...] perché in loro abbonda poco sangue, e però in quelli luoghi facilmente le persone si lasciano reggere per uno capo solo [...]. Nelle parte frigide aquilonari, dove abbonda assai sangue e poco ingegno, similmente stanno fermi

<sup>32</sup> G. SAVONAROLA, *Prediche sopra Aggeo con il Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze*, ed. L. Firpo, Rome 1965, pp. 442-43.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 446-47.

e subietti ad uno signore e capo loro. Ma nelle parte medie, come è la Italia, dove abbonda sangue e ingegno insieme, non stanno pazienti gli uomini sotto uno capo solo [...]. Però è consiglio de' dottori sacri che in questi luoghi, dove pare che la natura degli uomini non patisca superiore, sia meglio el reggimento de' più che d'uno solo [...].<sup>34</sup>

The most famous example of relativism comes from Niccolò Machiavelli. Although the connection he makes between social structures and political forms is original, nevertheless his geographic focus does recall Savonarola (a figure with whom he was notably preoccupied<sup>35</sup>) and earlier scholastic writers:

[...] dico che gentiluomini sono chiamati quelli che oziosi vivono delle rendite delle loro possessioni abbondantemente, senza avere cura alcuna o di coltivazione o di altra necessaria fatica a vivere. Questi tali sono perniziosi in ogni repubblica ed in ogni provincia; ma più perniziosi sono quelli che, oltre alle predette fortune, comandano a castella, ed hanno sudditi che ubbidiscono a loro. Di queste due spezie di uomini ne sono pieni il regno di Napoli, terra di Roma, la Romagna e la Lombardia. Di qui nasce che in quelle provincie non è mai surta alcuna repubblica né alcuno vivere politico; perché tali generazioni di uomini sono al tutto inimici d'ogni civiltà. Ed a volere in provincie fatte in simil modo introdurre una repubblica, non sarebbe possibile; ma a volerle riordinare, se alcuno ne fusse arbitro, non arebbe altra via che farvi uno regno. La ragione è questa, che, dove è tanto la materia corrotta che le leggi non bastano a frenarla, vi bisogna ordinare insieme con quelle maggior forza; la quale è una mano regia, che con la potenza assoluta ed eccessiva ponga freno alla eccessiva ambizione e corruttela de' potenti. Verificasi questa ragione con lo esempio di Toscana: dove si vede in poco spazio di terreno state lungamente tre repubbliche, Firenze, Siena e Lucca; e le altre città di quella provincia essere in modo serve, che, con lo animo e con l'ordine, si vede o che le mantengono o che le vorrebbero mantenere la loro libertà. Tutto è nato per non essere in quella provincia alcuno signore di castella, e nessuno o pochissimi gentiluomini; ma esservi tanta equalità, che facilmente da uno prudente, e che delle antiche civiltà avesse cognizioni, vi s'introdurrebbe uno vivere civile<sup>36</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Texts cited by N. RUBINSTEIN, *Savonarola on the government of Florence*, in *The World of Savonarola. Italian élites and the perceptions of crisis*, ed. S. Fletcher and C. Shaw, Aldershot 2000, p. 43, n. 12.

<sup>35</sup> See letters to Ricciardo Becchi (9.3.1498) and to Francesco Vettori (26.8.1513); N. MACHIAVELLI, *De principatibus*, vi, xii; ID., *Discorsi*, I.11.45.56, III.30; ID., *Decennale primo*, v. 157.

<sup>36</sup> MACHIAVELLI, *Discorsi*, I.55.

Nevertheless, Italy could of course boast many more independent republican governments in the later Middle Ages than any other part of Europe, and so, despite these resemblances to Northern political thought, it is to be expected that Italian political thinkers would have shown particular enthusiasm for republicanism. In fact, it was only in Italy that one finds categorical assertions that a republic was the best form of government. Perhaps the earliest came from Brunetto Latini. Aristotle had repeatedly stated that, in the abstract, monarchy was the best form of government<sup>37</sup>, and Latini learned his views from the *Compendium Alexandrium* made of the *Ethics*: ‘Principatus civiles tres sunt, principatus regum et principatus bonorum et principatus communitatum. Et omnium optimus est regum principatus’<sup>38</sup>. But in the *Trésor*, Latini reversed the preference, putting communal, i.e. republican, government first: “L’une est des rois, la seconde est des bons, la tierce est des communes, laquele est la très millour entre ces autres”<sup>39</sup>.

The most categorically republican scholastic was Ptolemy of Lucca (ca 1236-1327). He reduces Aristotle’s six-fold classification to two: “regimen despoticum” and “regimen politicum”, defining the latter as one carried out according to law for the benefit of the majority of the people<sup>40</sup>. He therefore assimilates “regimen regale” with “regimen despoticum” (“includendo in despotico etiam regale”<sup>41</sup>) and argues that a republican system (“regimen politicum”) is always preferable: “Regimen politicum regali praeponitur”<sup>42</sup>. He concedes that it is sometimes impossible to establish a republican regime, since some regions lack virtue and are less suited to liberty than to servitude:

Quaedam autem provinciae sunt servilis naturae: et tales gubernari debent principatu despotico<sup>43</sup>.

But in areas where virtue prevails, a “regimen politicum” is both the best and most natural form of government. He boasts that republicanism above all flourishes in Italy:

<sup>37</sup> See above, as well as ARISTOTLE, *Politics* III.XII.1.

<sup>38</sup> Cited by N. RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius of Padua and Italian political thought of his time... cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>39</sup> Cited *ibidem*.

<sup>40</sup> SKINNER, *The Foundations... cit.*, vol. I, p. 54.

<sup>41</sup> Cited by RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius... cit.*, p. 52, n. 3.

<sup>42</sup> Cited by BLYTHE, *Ideal Government... cit.*, p. 100, n. 20.

<sup>43</sup> Cited by RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius... cit.*, p. 52, n. 3.

Qui autem virilis animi et audacia cordis, et in confidentia suae intelligentiae sunt, tales regi non possunt nisi principatu politico, communi nomine extendendo ipsum ad aristocraticum. Tale autem dominium maxime in Italia viget<sup>44</sup>.

This is a region where freedom is so highly prized that it is impossible for tyranny to prevail<sup>45</sup>. Republican government was also preferred by the ancient Romans: “apud sapientes et homines virtuosos, ut fuerunt antiqui Romani [...] regimen politicum melius fuit”<sup>46</sup>. He is a consistent champion of the Roman Republic and critic of the Empire, celebrating republican institutions and heroes such as Cato and Cicero, and vilifying Julius Caesar as a usurper<sup>47</sup>.

Another committed republican was Marsilius of Padua. He argued that in every political community, sovereignty belonged to a legislator consisting of the “populum seu civium universitatem aut eius valenciorem partem”. “It seems clear that Marsilius intends the ‘weightier part’ to include all free adult males of all classes, with the exception of a very few ‘deformed’ men, whose lack of reason would impede or prevent the implementation of the common good”<sup>48</sup>. Marsilius goes on to say that the legislator can devolve the administration of government (“pars principans”) into the hands of various types of regime, including an elective monarchy (such as the Roman Empire), but a republic remains for him the best form of government: “individual legislators are liable to make laws to suit their private rather than the public interest: ‘the authority to make laws belongs, therefore, to the whole body of citizens or to the weightier part thereof [...]. For since no one knowingly harms [...] himself, it follows that all or most want a law conducive to the common benefit of the citizens’. Unlike St Thomas and Giles of Rome, he does not consider a monarch best fitted to procure the common good of the people”<sup>49</sup>. “Marsilius [...] believed [...] popular sovereignty in every case [to be] the best means to the common good”<sup>50</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Cited by RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius... cit.*, p. 52, n. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Cfr. SKINNER, *The Foundations... cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>46</sup> Cited by BLYTHE, *Ideal Government... cit.*, p. 103, n. 25.

<sup>47</sup> Cfr. SKINNER, *The Foundations... cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>48</sup> BLYTHE, ‘Civic humanism’... *cit.*, p. 64; ID., *Ideal Government... cit.*, pp. 196-97.

<sup>49</sup> RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius... cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>50</sup> BLYTHE, *Ideal Government... cit.*, p. 65.

Another ardent republican was the younger Salutati. It has been seen that he showed monarchical sympathies in later life, but in the 1370s, as Florence was moving to a more popular regime and as the city found itself at war with the Papacy and in alliance with other independent communes or insurgent peoples, the young chancellor expressed unqualified republican sympathies. Encouraging the Roman people to rebel against the papacy on 6th November 1377, Salutati declared that their empire had been won under a free republic:

[...] non putetis, excellentissimi domini, quod maiores vestri et nostri, [qui] communibus quidem parentibus gloriamur, serviendo domi, tantum tamque memorabile Imperii de[c]us [...] fundaverunt nec dimictendo suam ytaliam sub externa vel domestica servitute. Illa quidem moles imperii, assistendo sociis et pro eorum libertate pugnando, vobis primo subegit ytaliam, yspaniam vicit, affricam superavit, demum vero in tantam est imperium vestrum sublimitatem evectum quod romanum nomen cunctis nationibus prefuerit<sup>51</sup>.

Under the Empire, however, Italy had been devastated and Roman power had declined; liberty alone had achieved glory and empire for Rome:

Sublata autem sub cesaribus libertate [...] in ipsorum manibus certe vastitatem recepit ytaliam et illud imperii culmen effluxit. Solum itaque libertatis studium et imperium et gloriam et omnem romanis peperit dignitatem<sup>52</sup>.

In a letter to Bologna on 28 July 1376, Salutati linked republican liberty inherently with all the benefits of civic life:

Quid autem honestius, quid securius quam optata perfrui libertate? Hec quidem sola, civitates exaltans, populos mirabilibus multiplicat incrementis, res familiares amplificat, statumque et maiestatem civium decore mire venustatis exornat. Hec est mater legum cum non ad libidinem et voluntatem unius sed ad utilitatem publicam referantur. Hec est magistra virtutum quoniam nemo dubitat in sua republica que libertate floreat, quantum quidve virtuosum efficere possit, ostendere, ad quod etiam adeo optimorum civium animi concitantur quod non verentur morte pulcherrima pro salute patrie animas expirare<sup>53</sup>.

<sup>51</sup> Cited by WITT, *The De tyranno... cit.*, p. 452.

<sup>52</sup> Cited *ibidem*.

<sup>53</sup> Cited *ibidem*, p. 453.



He concluded his remarks with a total condemnation of monarchy as an institution:

Cogitate ut divinarum scripturarum attestantur oracula reges ob peccata populorum ab initio constitutos qui, quantumcunque iusti, populos non regerent sed punirent. Quicumque se dominio dignum putat se reum magnorum scelerum confitetur cum constet dominos non fore civitatibus ornatui sed supplicio et populorum oneri fore propositos, non honori<sup>54</sup>.

Further unqualified support for republics came from another Florentine chancellor, Leonardo Bruni. His *Oratio in funere Ioannis Stroze*, datable to 1428, contains unreserved praise for Florence in terms of liberty and equality. A monarchy and a republic differ crucially in that the latter boasts

aequa omnibus libertas, legibus solum obtemperans [...] Spes vero honoris adipiscendi ac se attolendi par [...] <sup>55</sup>.

Florentine liberty means equality before the law and protection from over-mighty subjects (Bruni specifically cites the anti-magnate Ordinances of Justices of 1293 in this context). The opportunity to achieve office aids citizens to awaken their innate talents:

Atque haec honorum adipiscendorum facultas potestasque libero populo [...] quantum valet ad ingenia civium excitanda [...] <sup>56</sup>.

Monarchies are inferior to republics because they fear lest the successes of their subjects should diminish royal power. Bruni even asserts that monarchy is an illegitimate form of government, on the grounds that a king never acts entirely for the benefit of his subjects; a republic, on the other hand, exercises authority in the interests of all the citizens<sup>57</sup>.

The absolute superiority of republics over principalities is an important theme in Machiavelli's *Discourses*. In 1515, two years after

<sup>54</sup> Cited *ibidem*, p. 454.

<sup>55</sup> Cited by N. RUBINSTEIN, *Florentine constitutionalism and Medici ascendancy*, in *Florentine Studies*, ed. idem, London 1968, p. 447, n. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Cited *ibidem*, p. 447, n. 2.

<sup>57</sup> See J. HANKINS, *The civic panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni*, in *Renaissance Civic Humanism...* cit., pp. 153-4.

completing *The Prince*, Machiavelli was still out of a job. Moreover, his hopes for Medici patronage dwindled to nil as the pope's nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici, duke of Urbino, came to dominate the Florentine political scene. Lorenzo preferred Machiavelli's literary rivals<sup>58</sup>, and so Machiavelli began to look beyond the Medici for patronage. In particular, there was a circle of aristocrats who longed for the return to a genuine republic in Florence and who met informally in gardens of the Rucellai, an important Florentine family. Machiavelli joined these gatherings, and received a far warmer welcome there than he had done from the Medici: at last he was again taken seriously. It is not surprising that, in the more hopeful surroundings offered by the Rucellai gardens, he too began to think that the restoration of a true republic in Florence was not impossible. For him a republic had always been the most vital of all political regimes<sup>59</sup>, but after 1512, in the wake of renewed Medici dominance in Florence and of continued international warfare, he had been forced to conclude that Italy was at the lowest point in what he saw as a political cycle, where only the rule of a tyrant would work in most parts of the peninsula<sup>60</sup>. But with the general pacification of Italy beginning in 1516, his vision of this cycle became more positive; the profound personal and political depression under which he wrote *The Prince* had passed, replaced by optimism shared with his companions in the Rucellai gardens. The Medici in Florence were unpopular; their regime was seen as weak;

<sup>58</sup> See P. GODMAN, *From Poliziano to Machiavelli*, Princeton 1996.

<sup>59</sup> MACHIAVELLI, *De principatibus*, ch. 5: "Ma nelle repubbliche è maggiore vita, maggiore odio, più desiderio di vendetta; né li lascia, né può lasciare riposare la memoria della antiqua libertà".

<sup>60</sup> Compare MACHIAVELLI, *De principatibus*, ch. 6 ("Era dunque necessario a Moisè trovare il popolo d'Isdrael, in Egitto, stiavo e oppresso dagli Egizii [...]") with *ibidem*, ch. 26 ("[...] mi pare concorrino tante cose in beneficio di uno principe nuovo, che io non so qual mai tempo fussi più atto a questo. E se, come io dissi, era necessario, volendo vedere la virtù di Moisè, che il popolo d'Isdrael fussi stiavo in Egitto [...]"). For the identification of the "principe nuovo" with a tyrant, see MACHIAVELLI, *Discorsi*, I.25-26: "[...] ma quello che vuole fare una potestà assoluta, la quale dagli autori è chiamata tirannide, debbe rinnovare ogni cosa, come nel seguente capitolo si dirà. Qualunque diventa principe o d'una città o d'uno stato, e tanto più quando i fondamenti suoi fussono deboli, e non si volga o per via di regno o di republica alla vita civile; il migliore rimedio che egli abbia, a tenere quel principato, è, sendo egli nuovo principe, fare ogni cosa, in quello stato, di nuovo". For the Machiavellian cycle, with the principate at the bottom, see *ID.*, *Discorsi*, I.2.

many felt it was only a matter of time before they would be ousted<sup>61</sup>. Republican government now seemed right for Florence; Machiavelli's own contribution to this flurry of republican enthusiasm was to write his *Discorsi* as a handbook for the restoration of the Florentine republic. In this work, Machiavelli declared that

[...] sono migliori governi quegli de' popoli che quegli de' principi [...] se si discorreranno tutti i disordini de' popoli, tutti i disordini de' principi, tutte le glorie de' popoli e tutte quelle de' principi, si vedrà il popolo di bontà e di gloria essere, di lunga, superiore. E se i principi sono superiori a' popoli nello ordinare leggi, formare vite civili, ordinare statuti ed ordini nuovi; i popoli sono tanto superiori nel mantenere le cose ordinate, ch'egli aggiungono senza dubbio alla gloria di coloro che l'ordinano [...] dico come hanno durato assai gli stati de' principi, hanno durato assai gli stati delle repubbliche, e l'uno e l'altro ha avuto bisogno d'essere regolato dalle leggi: perché un principe che può fare ciò ch'ei vuole, è pazzo; un popolo che può fare ciò che vuole, non è savio. Se, adunque, si ragionerà d'un principe obbligato alle leggi, e d'un popolo incatenato da quelle, si vedrà più virtù nel popolo che nel principe: se si ragionerà dell'uno e dell'altro sciolto, si vedrà meno errori nel popolo che nel principe; e quelli minori, ed aranno maggiori remedi. Però che a un popolo licenzioso e tumultuario, gli può da un uomo buono essere parlato, e facilmente può essere ridotto nella via buona: a un principe cattivo non è alcuno che possa parlare, né vi è altro rimedio che il ferro. Da che si può fare coniettura della importanza della malattia dell'uno e dell'altro: ché se a curare la malattia del popolo bastan le parole, ed a quella del principe bisogna il ferro, non sarà mai alcuno che non giudichi, che, dove bisogna maggior cura, siano maggiori errori. Quando un popolo è bene sciolto, non si temano le pazzie che quello fa, né si ha paura del male presente, ma di quel che ne può nascere, potendo nascere, in fra tanta confusione, uno tiranno. Ma ne' principi cattivi interviene il contrario: che si teme il male presente, e nel futuro si spera; persuadendosi gli uomini che la sua cattiva vita possa fare sorgere una libertà. Sì che vedete la differenza dell'uno e dell'altro, la quale è quanto, dalle cose che sono, a quelle che hanno a essere. Le crudeltà della moltitudine sono contro a chi ei temano che occupi il bene commune: quelle d'un principe sono contro a chi ei temano che occupi il bene proprio. Ma la opinione contro ai popoli nasce perché de' popoli ciascuno dice male senza paura e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano: de' principi si parla sempre con mille paure e mille rispetti<sup>62</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> As demonstrated by my pupil, C.J. COLLETT, in his MA thesis, *Projects for reform in Medicean Florence 1512-1522*, University of Leeds, 1998.

<sup>62</sup> MACHIAVELLI, *Discorsi*, I.58.

Even in Machiavelli's day, however, republicanism was rapidly becoming an anachronism in Italy. Francesco Guicciardini had supported an aristocratic republic as the best form of government for Florence in both his *Discorso di Logrogno* of 1512 and his *Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze* of 1521-24, but when, during the siege of Florence in 1530, he came to complete the final version of his political *Ricordi*, he had come to the conclusion that republican government was no longer an option for Florence. Hence his repeated revisions of his earlier versions, excising references to republics or citizens and recasting them in terms of princes and subjects:

(1512 version)

Quelli cittadini che appetiscono riputazione nella città [...] sono laudabili e utili alla città: e dio volessi che le repubbliche fussino piene di questa ambizione<sup>63</sup>.

(1530 version)

La ambizione non è dannabile, né da vituperare quello ambizioso che ha appetito d'avere gloria co' mezzi onesti e onorevoli [...]. Quella è ambizione perniziosa e detestabile che ha per unico fine la grandezza, come hanno comunemente e principi [...]<sup>64</sup>.

In 1512, Guicciardini had written:

Tre cose desidero vedere innanzi alla morte: uno vivere di repubblica bene ordinato nella città nostra, Italia liberata da tutti e barbari e liberato el mondo dalla tirannide di questi scelerati preti<sup>65</sup>.

When he revised this *ricordo* in 1524, he voiced the same three hopes, but added, 'ma dubito, ancora che io vivessi molto, non ne vedere alcuna'<sup>66</sup>. When he returned the *Ricordi* once more in 1530, he did not even bother to copy this maxim out again: for Guicciardini, republicanism was dead.

<sup>63</sup> F. GUICCIARDINI, *Ricordi*, ed. R. Spongano, Florence 1951, p. 37.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 239.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*.