The current situation of conflict in Northern Nigeria in the past decade has been responsible for more displacement than in the region's previous recorded history. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria is the most terrorised country in Africa and the third most terrorised on the planet. The UNHCR and IDMC estimate over 3.2 million people displaced in the region with 2.58 millions of them scattered internally. The consistency of these conflicts has given rise to a perpetual process of internal displacement and rare forms of peripherality. IDP/Refugee camps are most often treated as periphery—appendices to the script of the city. As peripheries, IDP camps and informal settlements in various cities in the north are constantly faced with a pressing need to develop resilience for just surviving. There are currently no significant research attempts to study these resilience characters. The research focuses on the socio-spatial praxes of Durumi (Area 1) camp towards resilience. Durumi Camp is a rather surreptitious periphery sandwiched in a middle-class area in the city of Abuja in Nigeria. Using a mixed approach of ethnography, digital spatial analyses, and architecture, the new lives of the campers are studied in their simple but sophisticated adaptations to the dynamics of their new social and physical environment. The findings of the spatial study engage and further raise new questions and notions of the periphery in terms of socio-spatial compatibility, movement, re-enactment and re-invention of socio-spatial practices and cultures in African urbanity. The study also displaces the current theories of the periphery that describe it as fully dependent on the city center in terms of innovation. The study is a product of three years of ethnographic field work and spatial study in the area. It helps expand the discourse of the center and periphery in the context of conflict, displacement, and vulnerability.

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DURUMI CAMP, ABUJA: CONFLICT AND THE SPATIAL PRAXES OF A FURTIVE-PERIPHERY

Stephen Àjàdí

Introduction

The idea of city centers and peripheries significantly predates the arrival and "departure" of the West, in African cities (Mábògùnjé, 1968). Despite the influence of the West, center-periphery relationships of Nigerian cities are still driven mainly by trade, culture, war, and religion (Hassan & Na'ibi, 1962; Mábògùnjé, 1968) in contrast to forces like industry, housing, and state influence found in the West (Cooke, 1990). In view of these Afrocentric forces, this work focuses on the notion of conflict and the idea of the resilience and peripheralization of a group of people in North-central Nigeria over an ethnographic study period of four years. It attempts to put forward a new notion of the "center" and the "periphery" using the west African city of Abuja as a jumping-off point. It does this through a spatiotemporal appraisal of Abuja in the context of conflict.

Conflict and the Spatiality of the Periphery in Northern Nigeria

The "center" and "periphery" of ancient Northern Nigeria was catalysed mainly by dynastic inequalities, conflict, trade, and religion. These forces have helped forge commercial complexity as well as wars. The imperial era ushered Islam into the continent. Prior to 632 A.D., Africans practiced a wide range of religious beliefs; at the mentioned period, Islam found its way to the North… in Egypt (Hatch, 1971). In the 11th century, Islam made its way to West Sudan from where it would eventually penetrate West Africa and then Hausa land (Northern Nigeria) through trade with Borno and Mali (Crowder, 1962; Okoye, 2014). The spatial propagation of religion in what is now Northern Nigeria came with force and war campaigns of multiple cities and kingdoms.

The propagation from the centers was not only about displacement but of conversion. Displacement in terms of material space therefore did not matter as the displaced were pursued, caught, and forcefully converted. This insight helps set a historical backdrop to the formation of centers and peripheries in Northern Nigeria.

Another catalyst is the wall. The wall, as object-oriented as it may seem, is a highly socio-spatial force in the context of Northern Nigeria and has catalysed the formation of centers in terms of power, social inequality, and economic polarization (Hassan & Na'ibi, 1962). It is almost incomplete to document a history of walls in Northern Nigeria without documenting conflict and wars. Walls created and determined political borders and territories in ancient Northern Nigeria (Effah-Gyamfi, 1986). There are many famous cities/kingdoms such as Tunrunku, Zazzau, Kauru, and Zuba, that are known to have been walled. These walls played pivotal roles during wars against them for territory and religious domination (Hassan & Na'ibi, 1962).

It must also be noted that even though cities were taken over during wars, the walls were hardly destroyed; instead they were expanded or fortified to perpetuate spatial territoriality and power. The walls were clear-cut definitions of kingdom center-peripherality dichotomies. The peripherality in the case of walls was terminal, as whatever was outside the walls was not considered as part of the city or kingdom as the case may be. As for Abuja, where this study is based, the accounts of Hassan & Na'ibi imply that the walls of Abuja which were built starting 1829 and first worked as a shield to ward off invaders during wars that involved many, including the Gwari and the Fulani. Subsequently, farming started outside the walls and small villages were built by the chiefs to "camp" slaves who worked on the farm. Now those walls no longer exist, except for some remains that include Queen Amina's wall in modern Zaria and the ancient walls of Kano. The historic impact of the Northern walls as a socio-spatial marker for power and territoriality is noteworthy, since similar responses to territories still exist today in Northern Nigeria (Comolli, 2015). Ancient cities like Kano and Zaria still control permeability at levels of migration, culture, and even policy.

The shift to a Western influence in the North started with the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903. The Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903) was a revolutionary outgrowth which led to an Islamic movement sparking a series of unrest and conflict across Hausaland (Northern Nigeria). Usman dan Fodio – a religious scholar, and a resistor of traditional northern beliefs – led the movement. The fall of his revolution and other kingdoms as a result led to the infiltration of the British who came with the notion of modernity embedded in the ideology of colonization. Modernity had a deep impact on the peripheralization of Africa and the colonisation of its spaces. Dussel argues that the birth of modernity, which he postulates as having occurred in 1492, presents, however falsely, the European as the "modern." Hegel (1956), amongst others, is perhaps one of the most explicit voices of modernity's blanket claims. The early "formal" references and nomenclatures

of a periphery (Hegel, 1956; Hegel, 1967; Dussel, 1993; Kuykendall, 1993) that insulated Europe from all other cavillations passed through various phases and got disseminated into pre-western, sub-Saharan Africa through the phase of colonization. Hegel hierarchializes Africa socio-spatially into three degrees of taxonomy (Hegel, 1956):

a. "Africa proper": South of the Sahara

b. "European Africa": North of the Sahara

c. "Egypt": territory that is connected to Asia.

This classification, loaded with the spatial referencing of modernity and, of course, racism, conjures an "African-ness" of Africa based on proximity and degree of "Blackness" to "Whiteness." Peripheralization, therefore, becomes not only a gradient of separation, but one of concealment. This is evident in the fallacy of developmentalism upon which modernity proliferated itself as a Eurocentric humanitarian agency for the rest of the new world (Mábògùnjé, 1968). It is not surprising that modernist urban theory is totalising since it fails to cope with complexity (Cooke, 1990) and systems of exclusion that incite a peripheralization based on discrimination. Now class structure contributes to the framework of peripherality in Nigeria. Drivers like land, employment, religion, and governance all exhibit structural classism that hierarchializes people in space (Young, 1999). This can be said of the North of Nigeria as well. This structure was catalysed by the entry of the British, as explained, and the creation of peripheries of power from the previous peripheries of religion and ethnicity. The two latter structures did not die as hierarchialization systems but evolved and thrived, especially after Nigeria's independence.

Theories of the "Center-Periphery"

There are many theories of the center and the periphery, as dynamic situations have grown over the 1960s and 1970s. The categorization of the theories in Table 1 builds on Kühn's initial effort of grouping thoughts on the center, the periphery, and peripheralization. As explained in Table 1, the Euro-prescribed modernity has led to colonization, which has in turn created a mentality of downplaying the "non-western" in the African city. From politics to heritage identity to territorial recognition, the non-western has been surreptitiously and, in some cases, unconsciously seen as second-rate. It has also been observed that peripheries are seen as objects in the discourse of the city. Their legitimacy and relevance are usually seen in how they can better compliment the center. This problematizes theories of peripheralization as a state rather than a process. Contrary to the public message of urbanization, cities are shrinking as well (Reis et al., 2016). There exists a form of "rhythm" as economic, social, and

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Table 1
Theories of
peripheralization.

Theory	
Economic Polarization	This is primarily positioned as a contrast of the availability of innovations and an innovative workforce in the centers as opposed to the peripherals. It can also be likened to or seen as a development of the theory of "polarized development" (Friedmann, 1973). This is said to drive the market. Krugman explains that this theory is determined by the distance between the center and peripherals. This was later overrun (due to the evolution of more sophisticated forms of communication) by the idea of a "knowledge economy," which represents service-based economies also perceived as concentrated in the center (Crone, 2012).
Social Inequality	This is characterized mainly by the conditioning of marginalization and poverty. It argues that marginalization and poverty are manifestations of the center-periphery dichotomy. The overlaps of peripheralization and marginalization can be linked to poor governance, social stability, and – more importantly in this study – poor integration and power asymmetry (Jones, Leimgruber, & Nel, 2007).
Political Power	The theories of political power in the context of peripheralization are strongly linked to the accumulation of power in the center as opposed to the periphery. Power is usually found in the center as commerce, financial power, labor control, and innovation (Castells, 1977). This theory plays out in space (Forde, 2019; Lefebvre, 1991; Graham, 2011).
Communications	This is the idea of communications as a determining factor of interdependence between centers and peripheries and within both the later and former. Communication theories shifted the distance cost position of the economic theories to knowledge-based thinking as the idea of distance had to be re-thought in response to the development of communications (Kühn, 2015). Communication contributes to the social heterogeneous nature of the city and an organic tolerance of it (Merrifield, 1997; Katznelson, 1997; Sennett, 1977; Lefebvre, 1991; Berman, 1983). This is challenged in the contemporary city today as the complexity of communication sometimes leads to a development of segregation and peripheralization.

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Fig. 1
Conflict
proliferation
in Northern
Nigeria, based
largely on IEP
2018-2020
data.

political forces push people in and out of cities. This points to the fact that a periphery should not be seen as a static happening. Centers can become peripherals and vice versa if the right conditions and forces are at play for the right period of time (Fischer-Tahir & Naumann 2013; Kühn, 2015). If there exist possibilities of two-way shifts of either a center or periphery, then both spaces are equally relevant as identities.

Contemporary Conflict and Its State in Africa and Northern Nigeria

Conflict is a global phenomenon. It has affected the world in many ways, and it continues to impact it even in modern times. Recent global reports imply that conflict has risen most significantly in Africa over the past three decades, and most of the global conflict displacement in the past three years has taken place in the region (World Bank, 2017; IDMC, 2016; IDMC, 2018; IDMC, 2019). Alongside countries like DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and CAR, conflict in Northern Nigeria has risen to global attention, with an increase in concern for cities in conflict. The World Bank (2017) has shown that most of the displacement due to conflict has happened in low-income countries. In juxtaposition, since 2001, sub-Saharan Africa has had the highest consistent amount of internal displacement due to conflict (World Bank, 2017). In 2016, sub-Saharan Africa (14% of the global population) overtook the Middle East as the top conflict region in the world by risk levels and with 46.4% of the planet's human conflict-driven displacements (IDMC, 2016). In 2019, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 69.1% of the world's human conflict-driven displacement. In 2020, the value remains a significant 53.7% only because of growing conflict in the Middle East and not because of an inherent decrease (IDMC, 2019; IDMC, 2020).

As seen in Fig. 1, conflict in Northern Nigeria continues to expand, with new agencies proliferating, and displacement is still high (IDMC, 2019). Nigeria remains the most terrorised country in Africa and the third in the world (IEP, 2020), with insurgency, banditry and Fulani herdsmen conflict over land (Abbas, 2012; Okeke, 2019; Chinwokwu, 2017; IEP, 2018; IEP, 2020). Very recent attacks in the North of the country include the abduction of 333 boys from a secondary school in Kankara, Katsina (North-West Nigeria) on December 11, 2020. Shortly before this, (between the last week of November and the first week of December 2020), 110 were massacred in Borno, with Boko Haram claiming responsibility.

Conflict, Centers, and Periphery in Northern Nigeria

The propagation of the Northern states was majorly through conflict: the conflict triggered displacement and the formation of more colonies in expansion, bringing about a series of conflict-induced peripherality. The discourse of Hausa states is a lucid place to start the

peripheralization narrative of what is now Northern Nigeria and, in turn, the central part, called Abuja. Though there are many more cultures and languages in the North apart from Hausa, the development of the Kanem and, by extension, the Hausa states, creates a more holistic starting point to understand the North of Nigeria. The Hausa states were, in their early form, under the Kanem empire. Spatially, the English school of thought (Palmer, 1936; Johnston, 1967) mostly lays the origins of Hausa land or language domain as a region south of 13.5°N, when in fact it lies much further North, up to 17°N (Smith, 1970). It is hard to say if this was a conscious or unconscious concealment move. The early English school of thought is hence seen as problematic in the spatial delineation of Hausa land.

In terms of origin, there is a popular Hamitic narrative that described the formation of Hausa people as a "mixture" of Berner immigrants (Hamites) with an aboriginal negro people (Seligman, 1930; Palmer, 1936; Johnston, 1967; Smith, 1970; Hegel, 1956). Apart from the fact that Hamites have been proven to be Negros (Sanders, 1969), the claims have been found to have no supporting evidence and have been dismissed as inconclusive and racist (Haour & Rossi, 2010; Smith, 1970; Laya, 1992; Armstrong, 1960). From the 10th century on, the Kanem Kingship dichotomized its people as free and enslaved. Sayfuwa (also called the "*Mai*") were the ruling group, and their dynasty governed the Chad Basin upward over the next century. The incorporation of Islam into a syncretic synergy of pedagogy and religion spawned further conflict (Haour & Rossi, 2010). This led to the various micro and macro displacements which shifted the center of Kanem from Kaka/Jaja to Borno and then to Birni and onward. It was not until the 15th century that a new capital was consolidated (by Mai Ali-Ibn Dunama), which would last for the next three centuries. All through these times, the war-defined periphery shifted along with the centers.

In what is now Northern Nigeria, peripheralization at the scale of states began to be highly noticeable between A.D. 1000 and AD 1400 (Crowder, 1962). The Bakawi narrative (though mostly legend) and similar accounts (Laya, 1992) have it that the southern part of the very large Kanem-Bornu empire along the Chad initially consisted of seven main Hausa city states. The main city states, called the "Hausa Bakwai," are Daura, Katsina, Rano, Kano, Gobir, Biram, and Zaria (Hatch, 1971). The states spatially grew in influence and seven other states emerged as secondary (peripheral) areas that the Hausa Bakwai greatly influenced. These states were called Banza Bakwai (Bastard states) as considered in Hausa land: Zamfara, Kebbi, Gwari, Yauri, Nupe, Ilorin, and Kwarafafa (Crowder, 1962; Hatch, 1971). Zazzau, the southernmost part of the seven

states, would eventually give birth to Abuja through a peripheralization process of conflict and displacement.

Though conflict was rampant in the past millennium in what is now Northern Nigeria (and higher North), the 14th to 18th centuries where punctuated (more or less) by three main periods of conflict (Laya, 1992)[1]. In the first period, Kebbi rose to dominance in Western Hausaland (1500-1620). Next, Kano also rose to become a caliphate (1620-1730), and thirdly, from 1730-1808, Zamfara collapsed and Gobir rose to the peak of its power. All these times, slaves were drawn from some segregated groups during the wars (Laya, 1992; Hassan & Na'ibi, 1962), which created socio-spatial peripheralities as they were separated from the centers in power. Conflict during those periods were dynastic: between various social classes e.g., between *masu saratuta* (rulers) and the *talakawa* (peasants) and religious; between traditional religions and Islam. Also, conflicts erupted between *malaman fada* (court literati) and the *malaman kirgi* (religious literati) (Falola et al., 2000). The hierarchical relationships of the city center and its *na gefe* (peripherals) were of interdependency. The powerful protected their allied regions while the allied regions helped build the commerce and the collective economy.

Conflict, Peripheralization, and the Development of Abuja

The area of this study, Abuja, evolved from the Southwest part of Zazzau. Abuja at the time was populated by pagan tribes who were not Islamic. The Gwari Genge (the majority) and the Gwari Yemma, the Koro, the Gade, the Ganagana, the Gwandara, and the Bassa were all in the area that would become Abuja. Abuja was named after Abu Ja, son of Muhamman Makau (who was the first king of Zazzau), who built a new city after he fled from Lapai to come to Zuba then to Jiwa, where his father and brothers (Jaramai, Musa) were murdered in battle. Since Abu Ja had ventured far deep into the south, Abuja was the southernmost part of the seven Hausa states and Southwest of Zazzau. It was the farthest periphery to the center of power, and it was basically a breeding ground for slaves that serviced the domestic and commercial needs of the other six states. Abuja was never fully conquered until the British arrived. One of the reasons cities like Abuja survived can be attributed to the northward direction of major conflict from the 1600s until the campaign of Usman Dan Fodio that was cut short by the British (Laya, 1992; Ajayi & Crowther, 1976).

Spatially, Nigeria was made a country and so named in 1914 when the Northern and Southern protectorates were amalgamated under the authority of Sir Fredric Lugard. The name

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[1] The dynamics of conflict in the "North' and central Sudan in the 16th century can be seen in the map plotted by Ajayi Crowther (1976)

"Nigeria" was first proposed by the wife of Lugard, Flora Shaw, in an article she wrote for the *Times* in 1898 (Kirk-Greene, 1956). In addition to factors based on the dynamics of migration, wars, economic progressions, and trade, Nigeria has been regionalized to "North" and "South," a spatial dichotomy, much highlighted by the 19th century Sokoto Caliphate reign (Crowder, 1962; Hatch, 1971). Three decades after independence, Nigeria's capital moved from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 due to lack of space in Lagos and a monotony of the Yorùbá in the city (Fowler, 2008; Moore, 1984; Nwafor, 1980). It is located at the geometric center of the nation. Abuja was designed but developed rapidly, beyond expectation (Abubakar, 2014). In addition, spatial injustice due to the radical difference in zoning opinions between succeeding regimes, mass evictions, and housing inequality contributed to peripheralization by income and social class within the city (Ukoha & Beamish, 1997; Obiadi et al., 2019).

Methodology

The turn in spatial theory established space as the "social" which produces the physical (Soja, 1980; Soja, 1989; Foucault, 1991; Withers, 2009; Lefebvre, 1991). This deviated slightly from the social empiricism pushed by Harvey (Harvey, 1973; Harvey, 1990) and Castells (1977). The idea of social activity as space informs this study. Since praxis as a form of social activity is to be studied in a place that is referenced to other places (as periphery), a spatial approach is chosen in terms of methodology. Instead of focusing on larger regions, the "local" has become a growing significant standpoint of viewing conflict situations/consequences ethnographically (Miller, 2018; Theidon, 2000; Bräuchler, 2018; Collins & Watson, 2018); therefore, the study focuses on the Durumi camp with the aim of using the insights to help describe a larger narrative of the city. The study adapts a growing Mixed Methods Research (MMR) approach (Campell & Fiske, 1959; Johnson et al., 2007; Thaler, 2017; Luyt, 2012; Glynn & Ichino, 2015); therefore, GIS and Ethnographic Peace Research (EPR) are used to understand the praxis and spatial dynamics of the Durumi camp.

The study of the camp is mainly from 2015 to 2019. Of the recorded 2740 IDP (Internally Displaced People) in Durumi Camp, 1435 were surveyed progressively between 2016 and 2018, with additional studies made in 2019 and the first two months of 2020. The study site is spatially delineated in rectangles of 1.76 km^2 and of 8.27 km^2 rectangles (Fig. 2) with varying scopes of coverage. Calculated visitations have been made to the

camp on a weekly basis[2]. Surveys were not carried out directly via paper or digital readings (though they were stored this way). Engagements were verbal to create a uniform typology of feedback. The existing holistic data on displacement to Abuja has not been thorough across the IDP groups and clusters (UNHCR et al., 2015). It was primarily carried through very limited multiple site visits[3] of inspection by a group of NGOs led by the UNHCR in 2015. Agbaje carried out some studies at Durumi, but they were limited to fifty respondents and were focused on issues of memory and the female gender. In summary, no attention has been given to everyday resilience/innovation and generally the dynamics of IDP spaces in Abuja.

IDP Camps in Abuja

IDP (Internally Displaced People) are people displaced within a country upon the occurrence or introduction of factors that force them to flee. IDPs are different from refugees, who are people displaced outside of a country. Abuja, the national capital, is mostly kept out of all conflict discourses despite the attacks in and on the city in the past five years, as well as the arrival of IDP. Displaced people who cannot settle with friends/relations and cannot afford private accommodation end up in one of the camps in the city. When the insurgence of the Boko Haram sect and the Fulani herdsmen in Northeastern Nigeria continued to grow, new sets of displacement trajectories emerged, and some connected the regions of conflict with the city of Abuja. Conflict is therefore the primary factor for the existence of IDPs in Northern Nigeria and, as a result, in Abuja as well. There are four formal camps in Abuja, which are as follows: Durumi (Area 1), New Kuchingoro, Lugbe, and Kuje. However, a more robust list should include other major clusters of IDP within the city:

a. New Kuchingoro camp
b. Kuje Area (including Pegi)
c. Lugbe Camp
d. Durumi (Area 1) camp-like site
e. Wassa settlement
f. Jikwoyi (including Karu, Orozo, and Mararaba Loko host communities)
g. Waru, Yimitu, and Zhindyina host communities
h. Karamajiji and Wuye

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[2] Except periods where data becomes repetitive and gaps between 1-4 months are given to allow for major changes like a group shifting location within the area, a humanitarian project being carried out there or relatives away on farming work returning to the camp.
[3] The UNHCR spent only two days of site visits with other NGOs to survey all "known" IDP clusters in Abuja (UNHCR et al.)

This study focuses on the Durumi (Area 1) camp as a periphery. The camp was chosen for study because of its rare placement in between developed residential regions of the main city of Abuja. The displacement tracking matrix by the IOM aims at discovering new centers with each round of survey (IOM, 2019); however, Abuja has not been considered a necessary footprint.

Fig. 2
Spatial Mapping of Durumi Camp Showing All the Group (Àjàdí & Anwo-Ade).

The Durumi IDP Camp

The Durumi camp was set up on December 15, 2014; this was following a rapid displacement of people from Maiduguri after a series of conflict and violence. The camp has grown to a population of 2740 as of September 20, 2019. The camp is called the Durumi/Area 1 IDP camp. 324 families were detected in the whole camp (updates were made as the people got married). The urban footprint of the camp is more collective rather than specific.

It consists of 12 defined groups loosely dispersed along a cluster of middle-income neighbourhood housing punctuated by the Federal Internal Inland Revenue Service training center, i.e F.I.R.S. Fig. 2 shows spatial data of the camp groups in the context of site features and the contrasting built-up region in 1.76 km^2 and 8.27 km^2 spaces. There are two sites far from the main cluster, i.e., Dagba River and Banana village. The youth village is not fully identified as part of the camp, but some IDP reside there. Fig. 2 also shows spatial relationships and scaled proximities in a larger 8.27 km^2 sample. This cluster of groups make up the Durumi IDP camp. The groups are on private land informally leased to the IDP for unknown periods in which a three- to six-month notice is served if the properties are to be handed over to the owners. For this reason, housing is temporary and informal. The groups within the cluster are ready to move when conditions warrant. The groups function as a single unit. This is more so administratively than socially, as a central communal form of living is not evidently present. The camp is governed by a chairman/president, a vice president, a secretary, the women's leader, a PRO, a storekeeper, and a representative from each of the 12 groups. The groups are: Dagba River site, Dodo site, Maman Dzamghara site, Kanuri site, Abu site, Adabaza site, Hajja Mallam, F.I.R.S site, Banana village, Jumai site, Danja Fence, and Fulani site. The groups are either named after the predominant people in the group or the groups' locations. Camp communication is via a network guided by leadership and general assembly is prohibited for fear of high vulnerability in the case of a possible attack. In this context, the scattered form of the camp's set-up is, in itself, a security precaution.

1 Dodo site
2 F.I.R.S site
3 Jumai site
4 Maman Dzamghara
5 Danja Fence
6 Fulani Group
7 Kanuri Site
8 Hajia Mallam
9 Adabaza Site
10 Abu Site
A Football Field

B Built up area: 27.01%

V Other vacant interstitial land: 2.99%

L Light vegetation: 6.44%

Current IDP sites: 3.49%

R Roads and path ways: 10.31%

H Heavy vegetation: 36.60%

M Sand/Mud/Clay: 13.16%

Demographic Origins and Structure:

The Durumi camp is made up mainly of people from Borno and Adamawa. The Borno LGA includes MMC, Gambaro, Ngambaro, Gwangai, Biu, Gwoza, and Bama. Adamawa makes up about 3% of the camp population mainly with LGAs Golok and Michika. Fig. 3 shows the trajectory of IDP socio-spatial origins linked to their current camps. The data is from 1435 of the 2740 recorded IDP camp members. Some members decided not to indicate their camp locations and are designated "undocumented." This category makes up about 14.1% of the sample size. Due to this information lag, the F.I.R.S site and Fulani group are not delineated in the mapping of origins. The data, however, still links them with their respective communities in terms of camp identity. The Adamawa-Borno proportion in Durumi is also consistent with IOM data, which puts the total displacement proportions of IDP in the Northeast at 6.8% and 83.3%, respectively (IOM, 2019).

In the formative years of the camp (2015-2017) the rise of displacement in the northern LGAs also coincided with the influx spike in the camp; however, direct correlations have not been fully established. In the Northeast, Gwoza rose by 19.69%, Bama increased by 7.63%, Biu rose by 5.54%, Maiduguri MC, by 6.35%, Mafa by 6.68%. Konduga rose slightly

by 0.86%. Hawul, however, dropped by 3.56% (IOM, 2019). The DTM data, however, does not cover the LGAs of Gambaro, Ngambaro, and Gwangai. As mentioned earlier, the DTM and other allied data sources do not cover displacements and camps in Abuja (IOM, 2019).

❯
Table 2
Gender
Distribution
across Groups
in Durumi IDP
Camp (Ajayi,
1976).

Gender	Total	Undocumented	Student	House Spouse	Trader	Bike Transporter	Taxi Driver
F(%)	51	7.6	30.7	9.6	1.4	–	–
M(%)	49	13.2	29.4	0.6	3.1	0.7	0.4

	Farmer	Religious Practitioner	Job Applicant	Tailor	Teacher	None
F(%)	0.5	0.6	–	0.1	–	0.5
M(%)	0.5	–	0.5	–	0.1	0.5

❯
Fig. 3
Origins of the
Displaced at
Durumi IDP Camp.

As seen in Fig. 3, the camps are made up of a diversity of communities. Kanuri, Adabaza, Abu, and Dodo sites all have people form Adamawa and Borno, though in obvious significant unequal proportions. Danja fence is made up of Borno IDP only, but it is the most diverse in terms of community representation. The Durumi Camp therefore has a near-equal mix of diversity at the level of community.

In the camp, the dominance of people from Borno (96.6%) make it difficult for IDP from Adamawa (3.4%) to form a substantial mix throughout the camps. Though this is not a problem in that camp, it is known to cause conflict in other IDP camps in Abuja (UN-HCR et al., 2015). The data respondents are the ones resident in the camp, while the rest are often away to Nassarawa on farming projects to raise more money for their respective families. This explains the small number of farmers in the camp (Table 2). This is convenient for study as all of the recorded families on the camp are represented in the survey. The Adamawa IDP are found in Abu, Dodo, Kanuri, and Adabaza (four of the 12) sites. These sites are all spatially clustered, except the Kanuri site, which has the smallest dispersion of Adamawa IDP (Fig. 5). IDP from Adamawa are split into Golok and Michika origin communities (source of displacement). Golok makes up 1.3% of the sample size, while Michika makes up 2.3%. The people from Golok are found in Adabaza and Kanuri groups, while the people from Michika are found in Abu and Dodo sites. All four sites have less than 10% each in proportion to the whole sample selection. This implies that the Adamawa IDP are not as demographically spread-thin across the camp sites for a group that only makes up 3.4% of the total camp sample.

The gender distribution of the camp is almost equal (Fig. 4), with sample size consisting of a total distribution of 49% female and 51% male (Table 2). Even though the camp

is observed to be peaceful, with only one fatality related to conflict (involving two people) since the camp's inception until the end of 2019. Feelings of isolation and then conflict would have been expected within the camp due to a significant majority from Borno. However, there is peace. These spatial structures of origins and demography show how socially close-knitted the camp is. There exists no notion of "intra-periphery" within the camp with respect to demography, gender, or community origins. The clustering of the Adamawa minority and the near-even distribution of gender in skill, occupation, and even across the groups (Fig. 3; Table 2) show why there are no notions of periphery with respect to the mentioned parameters.

Durumi and the Idea of the Furtive Periphery

The furtive periphery of Abuja is created not only through power but by deliberate oversight and neglect. This study shows that the Durumi camp is interstitially within a middle-income residential area in Abuja, with a high-income space within it and around it to the west (Fig. 5). This spatial configuration makes the IDP disappear into the larger urban section. This makes it convenient for the government to ignore them. Socially, the people remain a periphery embedded within the larger sub-center, but the city as a whole does not recognize

⬆
Fig. 4
Relative
Family Density
and Gender
Distribution in
324 Families
(Àjàdí, Surakatu,
Olaniyi,
Mfonobong).

them as a "valid" periphery of the city. This is so even though they possess the marginalised properties of a typically perceived periphery in terms of income and employment, which are key factors that separate and hierarchialize people in Abuja (Young, 1999). Durumi camp also goes against typical theories of peripherality and peri-urbanity that imply that cities with centers radiate decreasingly in social, economic, and innovation qualities away from the center with decreasing proximity to it.

Looking deeper, based on peripherality theories of social inequality and communication, Durumi camp seems to be largely disconnected from the very space in which it is embedded. In the survey of the camp, 71% of the engaged IDP say that they feel disconnected even though they have social ties to the spatial context. Employment is difficult because they are perceived as a threat. This is perceived by 60% and 20% of male and female IDP respectively.

The camp has experienced humanitarianism and some limited government intervention, but not much has been done in terms of health and education. Government toilets

have been provided for Dodo site, but it is loaded by the entire camp. Dodo site has also been provided with livestock as micro-business start-ups. Other sites are yet to be covered. Generally, through humanitarianism, only 30% of the education needs are met in terms of space and supplies. The structure is not sustainable because teachers cannot be continuously paid to teach. 60.5% of the sampled IDP are students in almost equal proportions of gender (male: 30.7%, female: 29.4%; Table 2). An undocumented number of the children that attend nearby schools funded by some NGO or private individuals show evidence of poor education and, in some cases, negligence and abuse by the school systems. The current rampant cases of kidnapping school children[4] around the contiguities of Abuja in 2021 is also beginning to discourage education as an option for the parents/guardians of the children. Parents are more eager to marry off female children than further their education. There are, however, some rates of success in education, but they are significantly smaller upon observation. Definite findings have not been made in this regard[5]. However, it has been fully observed that the poor education has caused more internal disconnections within the camp, even at the scale of the family. This is because most of the student demographic have to go to the state of Nassarawa to farm with their parents/guardians for food and income. Nassarawa, therefore, is seen as a kind of "center" of food and potential income. This creates a layer of peripherality in the camp. The IDP are also disconnected from home as returning is still not an option due to the continuous conflict in the Northeast (in contrast to what the government claims). The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic[6] in the North is also an issue. These continuous developments are projected to even raise the influx of IDP into the city of Abuja.

Informality and Innovations of the Periphery

The notion of innovation as the yardstick or driver for peripheralization needs to be revisited. Friedmann's "Theory of polarized development" differentiates between "core regions" and "peripheral regions." Friedmann uses this theory to show a dichotomy between these two regions from the standpoint of technological, economic, and social innovation. He holds that innovation in these domains can only be found in the core areas, while the peripheral regions do not display corresponding evidence of innovation. The findings of this study

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[4] One of the manifestations of the main north-south conflict in Nigeria.
[5] A formal study into the development economy of the education of IDP children across Abuja is currently being made.
[6] The research scope does not cover in detail, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the peripheralisation of IDP in Abuja. This is because the impact is still unfolding, and more information and insights need to be acquired and studied as at the time of the submission of this study.

➡
Fig. 5
(a) Income
Map across
Durumi and
Immediate Areas
(b) Location-
snapshot of
Typical Housing
in a Group
(S.T Taiwo, 2016).

⬚ < $ 50 per month

☐ < $ 1000 per month

▥ < $ 600 per month

⬚ > $ 1000 per month

■ IDP areas

disagree with this notion, as most theories of center and periphery take the position that the periphery does not innovate.

The position is that innovation can happen in the city center or the periphery, which is also argued by Sheamur for similar cities. Living activities in the Durumi camp have proven otherwise: the IDP at the camp have responded to the living conditions and challenges with need-based innovation as well as other coping mechanisms (Table 3).

For the intermittency of water and electricity supply, they have developed living conditions that help optimize the use of sunlight. Problems of health are met with the effective

herbal skills of some in the camps, which are taught to others. Strategic social gatherings are also encouraged.

In response to their housing shortage, they are developing a building process in line with cutting-edge sustainability systems and the circular economy. Though their typical houses are very unhealthy in terms of space and materials (Fig. 5b), they are developing new ways of building. The use of renewable materials that are combined with temporality in mind exhibits effective circular economy principles, which push for a perpetual loop of material flow in buildings with financial advantages in the process. Plate 1 shows an example of a mosque built within existing trees, using mud as a binding agent to the blocks that can be re-used (hence borrowed), making the entire structure capable of disassembly. There have also been circular economy housing schemes designed by the author on the basis of the innovative housing praxes of the camp. In the project, most the innovations in Plate 1 were optimized[7] and applied.

To augment income, nearly half of the camp (47.6%) is undergoing passive re-displacement in the form of a search for better livelihood through farming in nearby Nasarawa. This is a dramatic rise from only 1% who identified as full-time farmers (only) upon entry. The optimization of this praxis has been linked to the near equal gender distribution across the camp. In addition, the family density ratio, i.e. the extent to which the families are as similar to a scenario of having a group filled with the most populous family population in a group, is rather low (<0.5 out of 1.0) for all groups (Fig. 4). Despite this, the uniformity of family demography can also be seen in the almost uniform mean family size across the camps: seven (three groups), six (three groups), five (five groups), four (three groups), i.e. a mean range size of seven to four across 324 measured families. A wider distribution of identical family size and gender distribution has therefore allowed the praxis of best practices to spread across the camp groups. Most families practice the same survival responses, which is partly determined by their family structure.

What, then, is the Peripheralization in Abuja?

As shown in this study, Abuja was born out of a peripheralization process of conflict and displacement. The entry of the British saw Abuja rise from a peripheral of the Hausa states to a national center of power that has all other parts of a country as peripherals to it. Spatially, the study shows that Abuja experiences three major levels of peripheralization processes that vary in scale. The processes are characterized by the impact of conflict and power asymmetries.

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[7] Designs can be seen on projects of www.penumbraspace.org

The smallest scale of peripheralization occurs within the camp's clusters, as about 47.6% are rhythmically re-displaced to Nassarawa in search of food and income, momentarily disconnecting families and creating a center out of a camp that is termed a "hidden" periphery. This new center is connected to a new periphery of Nassarawa. The second level of periphery is the notion of Durumi as a whole and how it is hidden in plain sight. Durumi is triggered into concealment by the national power identity of Abuja that must not be seen as a harbourer of IDP, which is evidence of the country's failure to end the conflict in Northeastern Nigeria. Though Durumi is not the only camp "unseen," it is the most clandestine, due to its location within a developed region and its fragmentation as it dissolves within it. Though the government has recently accepted the existence of IDP in Abuja, conscious policies and plans for integration are not yet evident. Lastly, the largest process of peripheralization positions Abuja as a center of power instrumentalized by the Fulani currently in power as a means of forcing their footprint of land ownership, grazing rights, and influence (Abbas, 2012; Okeke, 2019) across the entire country. There is a development of the rest of the country as a false and furtive spatial periphery that is being perpetrated by the government across the country for non-democratic political goals. The recent case of the RUGA settlement policy by the federal government of Nigeria that aimed to force the Fulani herdsmen on land as peripheries in all of the 36 states of the federation is a very bold example. The policies emanating from Abuja direct that each state in the country must create/mark out land for the Fulani herdsmen for them to graze their cattle. Though the policies have been nationally rejected, they are still being moved forward despite knowledge that the Fulani herdsmen were declared to be a terrorist organisation (IEP, 2018) and have been responsible for hundreds of deaths across

Socio-Spatial challenge	Setbacks	Response
Intermittency of Water and Electricity	The camps are not formally connected to water or electrical systems linking the camp groups.	Activities that require sunlight are systematically shifted to daytime.
		Some IDP use gas lamps that require very little kerosene to light some open spaces.
		Some illegally tap electricity from main lines.
		Two boreholes have been dug to serve water to the groups with tanks and taps stationed at the larger camps.
		A fuel generator is being used, however the cost of purchasing fuel is high. The generator is used for administrative purposes and funding for maintenance is from the council's purse.
Poor Health and Wellness Infrastructure	Only an approx. 16m² health facility serves 2740 people.	Herbal medicine is made from vegetation around camp. It has proven to be noticeably effective.
	Mortality rate is high among new-borns	Traditional midwifery is employed as a option to child delivery
	Mental health cases do not get help.	Social gathering of women to ease mental health (83% of the women claim it offers some form of help)
		Men gather in half the women's group size. Though no concrete data exists to show the impact, all groups take part in the process continuously, with large cases of friendship being built in the process...Especially in football games.
Poor Housing	No formal housing. The ones available are made out of thermally unfriendly and unsustainable materials with sizes as small as 3m² per family. Even at the assembly cost of $55 to $275 per unit, the 'houses' are still unaffordable by the campers. There are varied cultures of living.	Their shed design and construction models save materials that are reusable in many other ways (circular economy architecture).
		They also build with the possibility of extemporaneous disassembly or (and) relocation in mind.
		They make the best use of their immediate environment as a material source for building without causing harm to the components.
Lack of Steady Income	The stereotyping of the IDP as potential sources of threat affects chances of employment. Their standard of living has caused a growing socio-spatial divide of them from their immediate environment	Self-assessment: They already have a listed set of needs based on their own self-study. This ready to be shown to anyone willing to help.
		They have sought for land in Nasarawa—outside Abuja, to farm in order to generate or Augment their income. Families are split between camp and farm in ways that optimises farming business while protecting the family.
Governance & Security	People from different cultures, religions and backgrounds are unexpectedly brought together. Durumi camp is also scattered in sub-clusters. This makes establishing good leadership in the camp a daunting task. The scattered nature of the camp also complicates security.	Each of the 12 clusters are represented in the leadership council.
		Women have a leadership visibility as much as they think is fair. They are also included in all affairs of leadership.
		They have no tolerance for religious or cultural bias. Security is collective at the leadership level but decentralised in operation.

the country (Fig. 1). Despite this, conflicts as recent as January 2021 still show that Abuja remains adamant in forcing the Fulani on the rest of the country, especially southwestern and southeastern Nigeria. This is leading to killings and kidnappings of farmers and indigenous residents in the southwest and southeast, with scores dead already. Abuja now remains the political center of the nation with conflict-driven peripheries around and within it.

In conclusion, Durumi shows that the periphery should not be defined only by distance from a center. As such, this study proposes a new perspective of urban periphery in African cities. It also reveals that the periphery is mostly seen through the lens of the center. This is a misconception, since the early opinions of Euro-prescribed modernity come to reference. The development of scalable social innovation as a response to conflict and displacement in Durumi camp shows that peripheries should be best understood as regions that produce an identity that is socially, economically, and politically valid irrespective of a need for interdependency. Though interdependency of the center-periphery is indispensable for sustainable development, it must not be needlessly worked into certain one-way subsystems and parameters of peripheralization in which the narrative is about the center alone or primarily.

Acknowledgement

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