

Changes and Developments in the Linguistic Landscape of Present-Day Crimea

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1. *Introduction*

This paper aims at providing a snapshot of language use and attitudes in Crimea at two different points in time. Until March 2014, when Crimea joined the Russian Federation following a referendum, which was declared invalid by Ukraine, the EU and the UN, the linguistic landscape of the peninsula was distinguished by three main features: a) the predominance of Russian linked to the ethnic composition of the population and as a consequence of the Soviet policy of assimilation; b) the expanding functioning of Ukrainian, the state language, as the language of instruction and documentation in educational institutions and public offices and c) the revitalization of the community languages of formerly deported peoples and other minorities, who were struggling to reaffirm their ethnic and cultural identities (Bocale 2015).

For the purpose of this study, language policy is understood as a set of laws, regulations, norms and practices that operate to produce planned language change in a given society (Kaplan, Baldauf 1997: xi). Language policies may be developed and implemented at different levels, from official, institutional legislation and rules to informal communication and discourse circulating in public spaces. On the basis of the analysis of official documents on language policy and language planning and of media texts and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Crimea, this work aims to provide an account of the complex linguistic situation of this ethnically heterogeneous region as it has taken shape in the last few years.

2. *Crimea*

A relatively small peninsula sticking out into the Black Sea, Crimea has been, since ancient times, a steppingstone for human crossing and an important military and trading centre in the area. Crimea's multiethnic map was drawn repeatedly in the context of colonial settlement and targeted state policies. It was radically transformed by the Soviet policy of violent forced mass deportation and resettlement, affecting, above all, the Crimean Tatars, as well as the Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Italians and other smaller minorities, all based in the region.

In March 2014, Crimea was the only region within Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority. According to the 2001 census, the population of Crimea is 2,033,700 of which 58.5% are Russians, 24.4% Ukrainians, 12.1% Crimean Tatars and 1.5% Belarusians (CENS)¹. The remaining 3.5% is split between many different ethnicities, including Armenians, Jews, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Siberian and Volga Tatars, Karaims, Krymchaks and Italians. The high percentage of ethnic Russians in Crimea is accounted for by the fact that the peninsula was transferred from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian SSR only in 1954 (Sasse 2007).

Crimea's ethnic heterogeneity is not reflected in an equivalent plurality of languages. In its early years, the Soviet Union "developed an exemplary policy of language rights for minorities" (Spolsky 2009: 216). Lenin maintained that no language should be given the status of a state language and that all nationalities and cultures should be promoted in order for them to merge into a single Soviet socialist state. The Soviet Constitutions did not define the status of the Russian language and guaranteed Soviet citizens education in their native language (Grenoble 2003: 36). On the level of nationalities policy, this was reflected in the '*korenizacija*' (nativization, indigenization) programme, which aimed to support and develop cultural, political and economic elites among the ethnic communities. However, with Stalin's accession to power, and particularly from the early 1930's, the policy of *korenizacija* was abandoned and there was a growing movement towards Russification, which resulted in Russian gradually imposing itself as a lingua franca throughout the USSR, including in Crimea, often at the expense of local minority languages.

As a result of the Soviet assimilationist language policies, in Crimea Russian is spoken by 97% of the population (Charnysh 2013), and 76% of the population considers Russian to be their native language (Pylypenko 2004). Due to weak intergenerational language transmission in exile, formerly deported peoples returning to the peninsula are overwhelmingly Russian speakers (Izmirli 2012). Although 92 per cent of Crimean Tatars declare Crimean Tatar their native language in censuses and sociological surveys, the percentage of those who can speak the language is very low, with the vast majority knowing only a few expressions, such as greetings and family names.

Even as of March 2014, Russian was the primary language of communication in Crimean public institutions, education and business, and the informational space functioned predominantly in Russian and Ukrainian. Non-Russian print media accounted for only five per cent of the total print circulation in the peninsula, and, on public television, communities of formerly deported peoples² were allocated a mere 13-minute time slot weekly to broadcast in the community language (OSCE13).

¹ Data by the Ukrainian national statistical authorities report a decrease in the population of Crimea of 3.3% in the years 2001–2014 (1,967,259 inhabitants at 1st January 2014). <www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2014/zb/06/zb_nas_13.zip> (09/14).

² Ukraine recognizes the status of formerly deported peoples to Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks (Izmirli 2012).

After the demise of the USSR and the establishment of independent Ukraine, the Ukrainian government encountered difficulties in imposing Ukrainian as the state language in Crimea's predominantly Russian-speaking environment (Uehling 2004). There was a significant gap between the number of Russian-track schools (359) and the number of Ukrainian-track schools (7) in Crimea in the school year 2013–2014 (MIN)³.

Both before and after Crimea's incorporation into Russia, all communities of formerly deported peoples have been actively involved in promoting and reviving their languages and cultures. The well-organized and vocal Crimean Tatar community, which is numerically the most important minority among the formerly deported peoples, holds events throughout the peninsula to promote the Crimean Tatar language and culture. The Gaspirinsky Crimean Tatar Library, the Crimean Tatar Art Museum and the Crimean Tatar Drama Theatre in Simferopol' act as focal points for cultural activities. There is a great deal of concern among members of the community about the status of Crimean Tatar and the need to maintain and strengthen the language. Private individuals and NGOs try to fill the gap in state funding for minority language schools by seeking alternative ways of financing classes in Crimean Tatar.

Numerically smaller minority communities also have their own organizations, which run language classes and hold cultural events. In Kerč, the state funded House of the Nationalities hosts the representative offices of the German, Italian, Polish and Greek community associations. The German, Italian and Polish associations offer language courses while the Greek association has established a folk music ensemble that performs nationally and internationally. The Kerč Jewish community centre "Gesher" has a weekend school attended by about 40 students every year. Similar cultural community centres exist throughout Crimea and offer minority language courses to members of their communities (Izmirlı 2012; OSCE13).

3. *Language Policy in the Russian Federation*

The language policy of the Russian Federation is articulated in a number of different documents, the most relevant of which are the Constitution, the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation, the Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation, and the Law on Education in the Russian Federation. Some of the main points in these documents which are relevant to this investigation will be briefly highlighted below.

According to the 1993 constitution (K93), the Russian Federation is a multi-ethnic state where all nationalities have equal recognition, status and support of

³ Although apparently modest, these figures already represent a significant improvement in comparison with the situation in Ukrainian language education in the peninsula in the second half of the 1990's, when there was only one Ukrainian-track school.

their cultures. Article 19 (1) forbids all forms of discrimination on account of nationality and language and Article 26 (1) states that each person has the right to use their native language and to the free choice of their language of communication, education, instruction and creativity. The 1991 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation (Z91) declares Russian as the federal state language but, at the same time, ensures identical rights to all languages of the federation (Article 68). The republics enjoy the right to establish their own official languages, which can be used alongside the state language in all areas of life (Lubaś 2009: 214-218).

The relevance of Russian is extended with the 2005 ‘Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation’ (Z05). The law guarantees a special position for Russian as the state language throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation and for its use in the public domain and in state education, particularly in higher and upper secondary education. The law also establishes prescriptive norms for Russian language use, such as the avoidance of foreign and non-normative vocabulary. Although the law also specifies that the compulsory use of Russian should not be understood as a limitation to use the other languages of the peoples of the federation, it has been perceived as an attempt to emphasize and promote Russian at the expense of the other languages (Pyykkö 2010: 88-89).

The Law ‘On Education in the Russian Federation N 273-FZ’, which came into force on 1 September 2013 (Z13), is aimed at standardizing education across the federation. Article 14:1 (1) guarantees education in the state language, i.e. Russian, as well as the choice of which language is used for instruction and education, but within the possibilities offered by the education system. Russian is the default language of instruction (Art. 14:2). In state and municipal educational institutions throughout the country, teaching and learning of the state languages of the republics can be introduced in accordance with the legislation of the respective republics and in compliance with the federal state educational standards. However, teaching and learning of the state languages of the republics must not harm the teaching and learning of Russian (Art. 14:3). Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to study and receive pre-school, primary and basic education in their native language (among the languages of the Federation), within the possibilities offered by the educational system. In order for these rights to be realised, the required educational institutions must be provided (Art. 14:4). Overall, the new law on education conveys the message that if, on the one hand, citizens have the right to study their native language, on the other hand that right cannot come at the expense of studying Russian. Republican leaders have expressed their concern that the new law could limit the relevance of titular language education in the republics (Protassova *et al.* 2014).

By setting specific targets for the number of students of general educational institutions expected to have a high command of the Russian language on graduation, the adoption of the Federal Target Programmes “The Russian Language” (the most recent one for the years 2011–2015) is also believed to have further strengthened the position of Russian vis-à-vis the national languages (Ulasiuk 2011; Hogan-Brun, Melnyk 2012).

Since 2009, the *Edinyj Gosudarstvennyj Èkzamen* (Unified State Exam), or EGÈ, has become the only form of school leaving exam that allows, at the same time, students to access university. Based on their results in the EGÈ, pupils can be admitted to better or worse universities. The exam presently only has two compulsory subjects, Russian and mathematics, with other subjects depending on the faculties students intend to apply to. The introduction of the EGÈ has had the effect of reinforcing the position of Russian in relation to the national republican languages, as students are pressed to do well in Russian in order to get into the best universities.

About 90 ethnic languages are taught in the educational institutions of the Russian Federation. In the 21 republics of the federation, more than half of the schools offer some teaching in the local national language, mainly in primary education or as electives. Khaleeva (2006) identifies five different types of so-called “national” schools, i.e. schools that provide bilingual education in a minority national language in the Russian Federation. There are national schools where the national language is both a subject and a means of instruction in all years, and Russian is taught as a second language (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia), and national schools where the national language is the means of instruction until year 7 or 9, when all instruction switches to Russian, which, in the previous years, was L2 (Buryatia, Tyva, Chuvashia, Kalmykia, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and three of the seven republics situated in the Northern Caucasian region of the Russian Federation: Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan). There are also national schools with ethnic language instruction only up to year 4 (i.e. only at the primary school level), after which Russian becomes the means of instruction, and the ethnic language is taught as a subject (Tyva, Kalmykia, Mari-El, Mordovia, and the remaining four republics of the Northern Caucasian Region: Adygea, North Ossetia-Alania, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia). Next, we find schools with Russian-medium instruction in all years but with a more in-depth studying of national languages and cultures (Karelia, Mordovia, Mari-El, Udmurtia, Komi, Komi-Permyak Okrug and some schools in the Far North, Siberia and the Far East). Finally, there are a few schools with national language instruction throughout the school years but with the possibility of moving to Russian-instruction in the higher grades (these are mainly travelling schools beyond the Polar Circle and in the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug). Most teaching in the national languages is offered in national schools, which are usually located in rural zones because these are the areas where the largest communities of ethnic minorities reside. This restricts access to minority language education in urban areas, where the percentages of people who speak an ethnic language continues to diminish. Whereas some urban concentrations of Russophones can be linked to the historical trajectories of particular areas (for example, several urban centres were founded as military strongholds by the Russians in the Northern Caucasian region), Russian imposed itself among urban populations as one of the tools for social mobility in Central Asian republics and in Tatarstan in Soviet times (Veinguer 2013: 283; Schlyter 2012:

880), and has continued to remain the main language of urban environments in Udmurtia, Chuvashia, Mari El, and Mordovia (Zamyatin 2012: 89; Protassova *et al.* 2014: 16).

The evolution of language policies in the Russian Federation over the last twenty years has had a direct effect on the teaching and learning of minority languages throughout the country. In the 1990's, language revival of ethnic languages was a core policy objective of the national republics and moves were undertaken to increase schooling in national languages (Zamyatin 2012). Some republics, particularly those where non-Russians form a considerable part of the population (Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Komi and Mari El), even went so far as to set as a goal the compulsory teaching of their ethnic languages to all students regardless of ethnic origin. With the programme of political recentralization started in Russia in the 2000's, which found expression, *inter alia*, in the adoption of the 2005 Law on the State Language, the situation markedly changed, and the priority of language revival programmes strongly declined because of the redistribution of power and administrative responsibility within the education system: regional authorities saw their autonomy limited, while federal authorities increased their regulatory and supervisory involvement in language planning. Nowadays, regional authorities can no longer promote teaching languages that are regionally important. As mentioned earlier, the education reforms of recent years have further weakened the relevance of minority language education, among other things because they have reinforced the principle of the parents' choice of the language education for their children. The on-going fall in ethnic language teaching and learning, which has been recently documented among Chuvash, Bashkir and Tatar students (Alòs i Font 2014), can be interpreted as a consequence of the changes in Russian language policy over the last decade.

Having outlined the main points and issues of the language policy of the Russian Federation, the next section will analyse the changing linguistic landscape of present-day Crimea.

4. *Language Policy in Crimea since March 2014*

On April 11, 2014 the Crimean parliament adopted a new constitution that grants official status to Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar (K14). Despite the official multi-ethnicity and multilingualism of Crimea enshrined in the new constitution, there are reasons to believe that the formally proclaimed equality of the three languages has not yet translated into equality in practice. Among the areas where inequality in language promotion and support is most noticeable, language education policy and language use in public place play a special role.

Starting from the school year 2014–2015, pupils have studied Russian language and literature seven hours per week and Ukrainian language and literature two hours per week in Years 1–4, eight hours of Russian and two hours of Ukrainian in Years 5–6 and, finally, nine and two hours respectively in Years 7–11.

The percentage of Ukrainian teaching has decreased by four times and that of Russian has approximately doubled with respect to the School Year 2013–2014, which shows that there was comparatively more teaching of Russian in Crimean schools in the previous school year than there is teaching of Ukrainian now. The number of Ukrainian-track schools has strongly declined (NKA; NKb). In March 2015, parents were asked to choose the language of instruction for their children in the forthcoming school year. The Minister of Education Natal'ja Gončarova declared in a press interview released in August 2015 that no requests were made for Ukrainian first-grade instruction (AN; K1c). As a consequence, no Ukrainian first-grade classes will be formed in the 2015–2016 school year. This results in the closure of all seven Ukrainian-track schools previously functioning in the peninsula, although seventeen Ukrainian classes (none of them first-grade) will still run in Russian schools. Ukrainian will continue to be offered as an elective, that is a subject that can be taken on a voluntary basis, but is not required by the school curriculum. The number of Crimean Tatar schools has remained stable at fifteen, with thirty-five new first-grades opened in the school year 2015–2016. However, instruction in Crimean Tatar does not match the needs of the Crimean Tatar population, because it has been estimated that only about 3 percent of Crimean Tatar children are taught in their ethnic language (QHAe; QHaf).

In university education, there are now fewer options available for students wishing to study Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar at the graduate or postgraduate level as some faculties have been closed, officially because of low recruitment (SKa; SKb).

In June 2015, a new law on education was passed by the State Council of the Republic of Crimea (ZR15). The law states that instruction is provided in the state language (i.e. Russian) in Crimean educational institutions (Art. 12:1) but also guarantees Crimean citizens the right to study and receive pre-school, primary and basic education in their native language, including Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, within the possibilities offered by the educational system (Art. 12:2). The law has been fiercely criticised by Crimean Tatar elites (QHAb, QHAc) for not adequately reflecting the equal official status of the Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages. In particular, in the opinion of its detractors, the law does not give due consideration to the development and mutual enrichment of the different Crimean cultures and does not provide requirements that all students should learn all the official languages. Some critics have also argued that a law on languages, which commits the republic's authorities to equally promoting all republican languages, should be developed and approved in Crimea before the law on education is introduced (Ablaeva 2015). In Chuvashia, for example, the 1993 law on languages declared learning of Chuvash mandatory for all students (Marquardt 2012). In Tatarstan, the 1992 language law made Tatar a compulsory subject in educational institutions for all students, regardless of ethnicity, with an equal number of teaching hours given to Russian and Tatar (Veinguer 2013). The possibility for the Tatarstan language education system to become a model for Crimea has indeed been envisaged (K1b). The Crimean government has declared its commitment to work

out a project for a law to protect and regulate the use of all republican official languages in the peninsula (RIAN).

Crimean Tatar leaders have repeatedly voiced their concern that the actual implementation of measures to support and develop the use of Crimean Tatar is in effect delayed, ineffective or missing altogether (NKc; NKd). There have been reports of Crimean Tatars being threatened with dismissal if they speak Crimean Tatar while at work (NKe). The lack of practical implementation of the official status of Crimean Tatar has been lamented also with regard to tribunal and legal proceedings, for example, in cases when judges refused hearings to be conducted in Crimean Tatar (QHAA). Concerning Ukrainian, at the end of December 2014 a law was approved that allows the use of documents in their original version (i.e. without translation into Russian) in some legal and judicial proceedings in Crimea (KIa).

The media space was much freer in Crimea before March 2014 than it is now. All media outlets were required to reregister under Russian law by the end of March 2015, and many newspapers, TV channels and internet-based news sites failed to obtain reregistration and were forced to shut down or relocate their activities to mainland Ukraine (Shevchenko 2015; QHAD). Ukrainian TV channels and radio stations have not been allowed to resume their broadcasting in Crimea since March 2014, when they were forcibly closed down (KM).

Along with educational language policies, visual language use in public spaces is a crucial indicator of circulating ideologies about the legitimacy, authority and relevance of different languages (Shohamy 2006). The last part of this paper will examine some of the on-going changes in the visual linguistic landscape of Crimea. Overall, what is emerging as an underlying principle is the intention to create a Russian-only ambience in Crimea. This is particularly evident in public signage. There are about 14,000 road signs in Crimea, usually written in either Ukrainian and Russian, Ukrainian and English or Ukrainian only, which are being replaced with Russian only signs. According to Article 3 of the 2005 Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation, Russian is the compulsory language for geographical names and road signs.

Some externally visible public signs, such as hotel names, company names, brand names, commercial advertising, posters, signs on government and municipal properties and those on university buildings and other public signs have been promptly modified by just removing those letters of the word that made the word Ukrainian⁴. New signs are now installed only in Russian, and the old ones in Ukrainian are being replaced. This quick process of “deukrainization” is taking place in all areas where Ukrainian had previously been used. In language use, Ukrainian has been eliminated from official communication, the media and public signage. In language learning, the number of Ukrainian-language schools and Ukrainian-language tracks in higher education has been reduced, and instruction in Ukrainian as a second language has either been suppressed or

⁴ See Bilaniuk (2005) for analogous processes of quick Ukrainianization of public signs in the post-Soviet Ukraine of the 1990s.

diminished. Crimean Tatar is experiencing critical difficulties too, as the number of educational establishments providing instruction in this language does not provide for the needs of the Crimean Tatar population. Russian is being established as an unmarked, legitimate language in all dimensions of linguistic practice, in line with national language ideologies about the status of Russian in the Russian Federation.

5. *Final Remarks*

According to the new Crimean constitution, Crimea is a multiethnic and multilingual society where all nationalities and languages enjoy the same rights, protection and consideration. However, despite the advertised discourse of equality and the official status of the three languages, Crimea's current language policy and practice reflect and reproduce national linguistic ideologies that privilege and promote Russian over all other languages in the Russian Federation. Among the areas where the preferential support for the state language is more pervasive and influential, educational language policy and language use in public spaces take on a special role. In the educational sphere, there are striking contradictions between the proclaimed equality of Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar and the actual number of hours devoted to the teaching and learning of these languages in schools. The government does not seem to be interested in supporting plurilingual instruction by demanding that all official languages should be taught to the same extent. In the visual linguistic space, Russian is legitimised by its default use and universal application in all domains of public life. Notwithstanding the proclaimed equality established under the constitution, the reality is that Russian is becoming more and more dominant in all spheres of language usage, whereas the other official Crimean languages are relegated to a subordinate position. Through schooling and language use in public spheres, the new authorities of Crimea are perpetuating the assimilationist trend that prevailed in the Soviet Union throughout much of the twentieth century, and that has resurfaced and crystallised in the language policies and practices promoted in the Russian Federation in the last decade. As has been noted by Pavlenko (2013: 652), a defining feature of the post-Soviet space is the re-emergence of practices that shaped the history of the region's approaches to language education and other language-related issues. The scenario that is developing in Crimea now is a confirmation of the ongoing legacy of Soviet language policies and ideologies of linguistic and cultural homogenization.

Abbreviations

- AN: *V Krymu ne sozdali ni odnogo ukrainskogo klassa*, Editorial, “Argumenty Nedeli Krym”, 21.08.2015, <<http://an-crimea.ru/page/news/120710/>> (last accessed: 26.09.15).
- CENS: *All-Ukrainian Population Census*, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Kyjiv 2001, <<http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>> (last accessed: 20.09.14).
- K93: *Konstitucija Rossijskoj Federacii*. <<http://www.gov.ru/main/konst/konst0.html>> (last accessed: 16.01.15).
- K14: *Konstitucija Respubliki Krym* <<http://www.rada.crimea.ua/content/uploads/files/Constituciya.pdf>> (last accessed: 30.10.14).
- KIa: *Putin podpisal zakon o vozmožnosti ispol'zovanija pri rassmotrenii del v krymskich sudach dokumentov na ukrainskom jazyke*, Editorial, “Krym Inform”, 31.12.2014, <<http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/17164>> (last accessed: 25.01.15).
- KIb: *Krymu možet pomoč' opyt Tatarstana v izučenii nacional'nych jazykov – Minnichanov*, Editorial, “Krym Inform”, 18.08.2015, <<http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/27485>> (last accessed: 16.09.15).
- KIc: *V Krymu pri nabore pervoklassnikov ne postupalo zavedenij ot želajuščich obučat'sja na ukrainskom jazyke*, Editorial, “Krym Inform”, 22.08.2015, <<http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/27485>> (last accessed: 27.09.15).
- KM: *Aksenov: Relaunching of Ukrainian TV and Radio Broadcasting in Crimea is Wacky and Silly Idea*, Editorial, “Krymedia”, 24.03.2015, <<http://en.krymedia.ru/politics/3374202-Aksenov-Relaunching-of-Ukrainian-TV-and-Radio-Broadcasting-in-Crimea-is-Wacky-and-Silly-Idea>> (last accessed: 18.09.15).
- MIN: *Ministerstvo Osvity ta nauky, molodi ta sportu Avtonomnoï Respubliky Krym*, <<http://mon-ark.gov.ua>> (last accessed: 25.03.14).
- NKa: *Ukrainskij jazyk načal iščezat' iz krymskich škol ran'she vremeni*, Editorial, “Novosti Kryma za 15 minut”, 02.06.2014, <<http://15minut.org/article/ukrainskij-jazyk-nachal-ischezat-iz-krymskih-shkol-ranshe-vremeni-2014-06-02-15>> (last accessed: 12.09.14).

- NKb: *V Simferopole ukrainskaja gimnazija smenit nazvanie*, Editorial, “Novosti Kryma za 15 minut”, 13.11.2014, <<http://15minut.org/article/v-simferopole-ukrainskaja-gimnazija-smenit-nazvanie-2014-11-13-09-49-00-2014-11-13-10-00-00>> (last accessed: 23.11.14).
- NKc: *Remzi Il'jasov: Gosstatus krymskotatarskogo jazyka poka ostaetsja deklaracij*, Editorial, “Novosti Kryma za 15 minut”, 20.02.2015, <<http://15minut.org/article/remzi-ilyasov-gosstatus-krymskotatarskogo-yazyka-poka-ostaetsya-deklaratsiej-2015-02-20-18-58-07>> (last accessed: 26.02.15).
- NKd: *Krymskij spiker vyskazalsja protiv objazatel'nogo izučeniya krymskotatarskogo jazyka*, Editorial, “Novosti Kryma za 15 minut”, 04.03.2015, <<http://15minut.org/article/krymskij-spiker-vyskazalsja-protiv-obyazatel'nogo-izuchenija-krymskotatarskogo-yazyka-video-2015-03-04-18-52-14>> (last accessed: 24.03.15).
- NKe: *“Situacija ne tak odnoznačna”: Krymskij ombudsmen prokomentirovala jazykovej skandal v parikmacher-skoj Simferopolja*, Editorial, “Novosti Kryma za 15 minut”, 21.08.2015, <<http://15minut.org/article/situacija-ne-tak-odnoznachna-krymskij-ombudsmen-prokomentirovala-yazykovej-skandal-v-parikmacher-skoj-simferopolya-2015-08-21-15-15-20>> (last accessed: 16.09.15).
- OSCE13: *The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine*, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Vienna 2013, cf. <www.osce.org/hcnm/104309?download=true> (last accessed: 26.10.14).
- QHAa: *Sud'ja otkazalas' vesti zasedanie po fondu Krym na krymskotatarskom*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 27.01.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/sudya-otkazalas-vesti-zasedanie-po-fondu-krim-na-krimskotatarskom-142677.html>> (last accessed: 30.01.15).
- QHAb: *Krymskie tatory ne soglasny s proektom zakona ob obrazovanii v Krymu*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 09.02.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/krimskie-tatari-ne-soglasni-s-proektom-zakona-ob-obrazovanii-v-krimu-142950.html>> (last accessed: 20.02.2015).
- QHAc: *Gazeta “Golos Kryma” zaregistririvalas' po zakonodatel'stvu RF*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 30.03.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/gazeta-golos-krima-zaregistririvalas-po-zakonodatel'stvu-rf/143962/>> (last accessed: 20.09.15).

- QHAd: *Obščestvenniki vystupajut protiv zakona Kryma ob obrazovanii*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 10.02.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/obschestvenniki-vistupajut-protiv-zakona-kryma-ob-obrazovanii-142955.html>> (last accessed: 25.02.15).
- QHAe: *Na krymskotatarskom jazyke obučaetsja men'she 3% škol'nikov*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 09.09.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/ru/obrazovanie/na-krymskotatarskom-yazyke-obuchaetsya-menshe-3-shkolnikov/147783/>> (last accessed: 20.09.15).
- QHaf: *V krymskich školach sokratilos' količestvo krymskotatarskich klassov*, Editorial, “Crimean News Agency”, 21.09.2015, <<http://qha.com.ua/ru/obrazovanie/v-krymskih-shkolah-sokratilos-kolichestvo-krymskotatarskih-klassov/148416/>> (last accessed: 30.09.15).
- RIAN: *Dlja obsuždenija zakona o jazykach v Krymu sozdadut dva ekspertnyh soveta*, Editorial, “Ria Novosti”, 10.03.2015, <http://ria.ru/crimea_today/20150310/1051724497.html> (last accessed: 20.03.15).
- SKa: *V Tavričeskom universitete bol'she ne budet kafedry krymskotatarskoj literatury*, Editorial, “Sobytiya Kryma”, 05.09.2014, <<http://www.sobytiya.info/news/14/44279>> (last accessed: 10.09.14).
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Abstract

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Changes and Developments in the Linguistic Landscape of Present-Day Crimea

Following Crimea's incorporation into Russia in March 2014, the Crimean parliament adopted a new constitution granting official status to Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar. Despite the official multi-ethnicity and multilingualism of Crimea now constitutionally acknowledged, however, there is reason to believe that the formally proclaimed equality of the three languages has not translated into equality in practice. Among the areas where the inequality in language promotion and support is most noticeable, language education policy and language use in public place play a special role.